cs.LGMay 1, 2026

Meritocratic Fairness in Budgeted Combinatorial Multi-armed Bandits via Shapley Values

Authors: Shradha SharmaSwapnil DhamalShweta Jain

Organizations: Indian Institute of Technology Ropar

Abstract

We propose a new framework for meritocratic fairness in budgeted combinatorial multi-armed bandits with full-bandit feedback (BCMAB-FBF). Unlike semi-bandit feedback, the contribution of individual arms is not received in full-bandit feedback, making the setting significantly more challenging. To compute arm contributions in BCMAB-FBF, we first extend the Shapley value, a classical solution concept from cooperative game theory, to the KK-Shapley value, which captures the marginal contribution of an agent restricted to a set of size at most KK. We show that KK-Shapley value is a unique solution concept that satisfies Symmetry, Linearity, Null player, and efficiency properties. We next propose K-SVFair-FBF, a fairness-aware bandit algorithm that adaptively estimates KK-Shapley value with unknown valuation function. Unlike standard bandit literature on full bandit feedback, K-SVFair-FBF not only learns the valuation function under full feedback setting but also mitigates the noise arising from Monte Carlo approximations. Theoretically, we prove that K-SVFair-FBF achieves O(T3/4)O(T^{3/4}) regret bound on fairness regret. Through experiments on federated learning and social influence maximization datasets, we demonstrate that our approach achieves fairness and performs more effectively than existing baselines.

Explore similar work

May 7, 2026cs.LG

Multi-Objective Multi-Agent Bandits: From Learning Efficiency to Fairness Optimization

We study multi-objective multi-agent multi-armed bandits (MO-MA-MAB) under stochastic rewards, where agents observe heterogeneous reward vectors and communicate over time-varying graphs. We formulate this emerging problem setting to address \emph{efficient learning}, measured by Pareto regret, and incorporate \emph{fair learning} as an additional goal, captured via social welfare. To measure efficiency, we formulate Pareto regret and develop \textsc{Pareto UCB1 Gossip}, whose novel exploration radius explicitly separates statistical uncertainty in Pareto-based inference from consensus error. To express the fairness constraint, we formulate a Nash Social Welfare objective over preference-scalarized rewards and propose \textsc{Simulated NSW UCB Gossip}, which integrates preference-based reward simulation, gossip-based utility estimation, and UCB-style exploration. We prove that \textsc{Pareto UCB1 Gossip} achieves O(logT)\mathcal{O}(\log T) regret and an instance-independent rate of O(T)\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T}), while \textsc{Simulated NSW UCB Gossip} achieves an instance-independent regret bound of O(T3/4)\mathcal{O}(T^{3/4}). This separation reveals the cost of imposing the fairness constraint to our efficiency objective: fairness limits information aggregation and slows convergence. Experiments show that our methods consistently outperform baselines, improving performance by approximately 100%100\% and 50%50\% in the efficiency and fairness settings, respectively.
John Wang, Mengfan Xu
May 31, 2026cs.LG

Fairness in two-player zero-sum games with bandit feedback

We study two-player zero-sum games (TPZSGs) with bandit feedback under fairness constraints requiring every action to be played with probability at least α/mα/m. Existing instance-dependent results target pure\textit{pure} Nash equilibria, while fairness generically produces mixed\textit{mixed} equilibria, a harder learning target. Our key technical tool is a reparametrization: every fair strategy decomposes as p=(α/m)1+(1α)p~p = (α/m)\mathbf{1} + (1-α)\widetilde{p} with p~Δm\widetilde{p} \in Δ_m, and substituting into the payoff form yields pAq=p~A~qp^{\top}Aq = \widetilde{p}^{\top}\widetilde{A} q for a fair payoff matrix A~:=(1α)A+α1c\widetilde{A} := (1-α)A + α\mathbf{1} c^{\top}, where cj=1miA(i,j)c_j = \tfrac{1}{m}\sum_i A(i,j) is the column-mean vector. The fair game on AA is then equivalent to a standard zero-sum game on A~\widetilde{A}, so equilibrium existence, KKT structure, and LP basis stability reduce to classical results applied to A~\widetilde{A}. We derive the fair minimax value, fair Nash equilibrium, fair regret, and a clean dual representation showing the price of fairness is at most α(11/m)α(1-1/m) and vanishes whenever the unconstrained equilibrium already has full support. Our main result is an O~(T2/3)\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3}) regret bound for an Explore-Then-Commit algorithm, Fair-ETC-TPZSG\texttt{Fair-ETC-TPZSG}, applicable to general mixed fair equilibria, together with a discussion of why naive action elimination does not readily improve it. When the fair equilibrium has a single dominant action, equivalently when p~\widetilde{p}^{\star} is a vertex of ΔmΔ_m, the bound sharpens to instance-dependent O~(1/Δ~(α)2)\widetilde{O}(1/\widetildeΔ(α)^{2}), where Δ~(α)\widetildeΔ(α) is the LP-margin gap.
S Akash, Pratik Gajane
Jan 30, 2026cs.LG

Improved Algorithms for Nash Welfare in Linear Bandits

Nash regret has recently emerged as a principled fairness-aware performance metric for stochastic multi-armed bandits, motivated by the Nash Social Welfare objective. Although this notion has been extended to linear bandits, existing results suffer from suboptimality in ambient dimension dd, stemming from proof techniques that rely on restrictive concentration inequalities. In this work, we resolve this open problem by introducing new analytical tools that yield an order-optimal Nash regret bound in linear bandits. Beyond Nash regret, we initiate the study of pp-means regret in linear bandits, a unifying framework that interpolates between fairness and utility objectives and strictly generalizes Nash regret. We propose a generic algorithmic framework, FairLinBandit, that works as a meta-algorithm on top of any linear bandit strategy. We instantiate this framework using two bandit algorithms: Phased Elimination and Upper Confidence Bound, and prove that both achieve sublinear pp-means regret for the entire range of pp. Extensive experiments on linear bandit instances generated from real-world datasets demonstrate that our methods consistently outperform the existing state-of-the-art baseline.
Dhruv Sarkar, Nishant Pandey, Sayak Ray Chowdhury