Minimizing Collateral Damage in Activation Steering

Activation steering has emerged as a popular inference-time technique for modulating the behavior of large language models (LLMs). By constructing a steering vector from examples of a target behavior and injecting it into intermediate activations during inference, activation steering enables flexible behavioral control while avoiding the permanent parameter updates required by finetuning. Meanwhile, recent work has identified emergent misalignment (EM) as a significant safety concern, wherein models finetuned on unsafe examples from a narrow task may unexpectedly generalize to broadly unsafe behavior on unrelated tasks. Although finetuning-induced EM has been extensively studied, whether activation steering can induce EM remains comparatively under-explored, despite its increasing use as a model-control technique. In this paper, we present a comprehensive study of activation-steering-induced emergent misalignment, substantially expanding the evaluation scope beyond existing pioneering work. First, we show that activation steering can induce broad misalignment, even in the recent Qwen-3.5 series. Moreover, activation-steered models produce harmful responses with stronger semantic relevance and higher coherence than their finetuned counterparts, making the resulting misalignment potentially more harmful. Second, we characterize properties of AS-induced EM by analyzing key steering-specific factors, including steering magnitude, the low-rank structure of the steering subspace, and the number of epochs during steering-vector construction. Third, we evaluate the robustness and sensitivity of AS-induced EM across diverse model families, model scales, target tasks, and intervention layers. Our findings reveal activation steering as a significant yet under-examined source of emergent misalignment and provide an activation-space perspective for understanding the mechanisms and safety risks of EM.

Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be induced by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization. Recent evidence suggests that some misalignment behaviors are encoded as linear structure in activation space, making it tractable via activation steering, which could be used as a lightweight runtime defense. We implement three methods: Steer-With-Fixed-Coefficient (SwFC), which applies uniform additive steering, and two novel projection-aware methods, Steer-to-Target-Projection (StTP) and Steer-to-Mirror-Projection (StMP), that use a logistic regression decision boundary to selectively intervene only on tokens whose activations fall below the threshold. We evaluate these methods on two threat models, dishonesty and dismissiveness, using malicious system prompts as a controlled proxy for misalignment. We conduct our experiments on two architectures (Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and Qwen3.6-27B). All methods substantially recover alignment. StTP and StMP preserve general capabilities (MMLU, MT-Bench, AlpacaEval) better than uniform steering. Finally, we show that our honesty steering generalizes to out-of-distribution scenarios: a single honesty direction extracted from the aligned model significantly raises scores on the MASK benchmark, suppresses deception in multi-agent settings (Among Us), doubles the hidden-behavior discovery rate on AuditBench, and restores honesty in an emergently misaligned model

Activation steering provides a lightweight inference-time mechanism for controlling large language models (LLMs) by modifying their internal activation vectors toward desired behaviors. Most existing methods compute a fixed steering direction in the original activation space, typically from pairs of contrastive examples using mean differences, linear probes, or arbitrary separability criteria. While effective to a certain extent, these methods treat behavioral control as a global, linear, additive offset: the same direction is applied across inputs, and behaviors are linearly separable. This can be restrictive when behavioral features vary nonlinearly across the activation space or lie on curved and anisotropic manifolds, where the optimal intervention may be input-dependent. To address this limitation, we propose INNSteer, a nonlinear activation steering framework based on invertible latent transformations. Rather than searching for a better steering vector in the original representation space, INNSteer learns a lightweight invertible neural network $φ$ that maps an LLM's activations into a latent space where behavioral classes are more amenable to linear control. At inference time, activations are mapped through $φ$, steered in the latent space, and mapped back through the exact inverse transformation $φ^{-1}$. This makes a simple latent-space translation become a nonlinear, input-dependent intervention in the original activation space. Across experiment settings on multiple LLM families, scales, behavioral traits, and safety benchmarks, INNSteer consistently improves model control over linear, transport-based, and nonlinear steering baselines while largely preserving generation fluency.