Are LLMs More Skeptical of Entertainment News?

Commercial large language models are increasingly used as knowledge references, yet their stance on contested scientific claims is neither stable nor transparent. We tested how four major LLM families (Claude, Grok, GPT, Gemini) evaluate ethnonationalist pseudo-science derived from Frank Salter's biosocial framework across four temporal snapshots (October 2025-February 2026), via both API and web interfaces. Grok's Fast versions (which power the default user experience on X) consistently assigned credibility scores of 70-75, two to five times higher than all other models (which scored 15-40). This pattern was absent from control prompts testing basic evolutionary consensus and refuted Lamarckian claims, where all models performed comparably. Three additional findings emerged: (1) a silent patch reversed Grok's behaviour from chaotic to stably high validation overnight, without any public documentation; (2) the same Grok model identifier produced radically divergent outputs via API (75) and an unstable, near-zero collapse via web (mean 5.5) three months later; (3) refusal to rate the pseudo-scientific claim, the most defensible response observed, appeared in two model families through different interfaces (Claude Opus 4.1 categorically via web, GPT-5.1 Chat intermittently via API) and eroded in the successor version of each. These results indicate that the epistemic stance of a commercial LLM is not a stable property of the model but a contingent effect of deployment configuration: system prompts, safety layers, interface routing, and silent updates. This remains opaque to users and researchers alike. We argue this constitutes a matter of public concern requiring new forms of epistemic accountability.

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

From generating headlines to fabricating news, the Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically assessed by their final outputs, under the safety assumption that a refusal response signifies safe reasoning throughout the entire process. Challenging this assumption, our study reveals that during fake news generation, even when a model rejects a harmful request, its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning may still internally contain and propagate unsafe narratives. To analyze this phenomenon, we introduce a unified safety-analysis framework that systematically deconstructs CoT generation across model layers and evaluates the role of individual attention heads through Jacobian-based spectral metrics. Within this framework, we introduce three interpretable measures: stability, geometry, and energy to quantify how specific attention heads respond or embed deceptive reasoning patterns. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning-oriented LLMs show that the generation risk rises significantly when the thinking mode is activated, where the critical routing decisions are concentrated in only a few contiguous mid-depth layers. By precisely identifying the attention heads responsible for this divergence, our work challenges the assumption that refusal implies safety and provides a new understanding perspective for mitigating latent reasoning risks.