Taming the Curses of Multiagency in Robust Markov Games with Large State Space through Linear Function Approximation
Authors: Jingchu Gai, Laixi Shi
Organizations: Machine Learning Department, Carnegie Mellon University. · Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Johns Hopkins University, MD 21286, USA.
Abstract
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) holds great potential but faces robustness challenges due to environmental uncertainty. To address this, distributionally robust Markov games (RMGs) optimize worst-case performance when the environment deviates from the nominal model within a uncertainty set. Beyond robustness, an equally urgent goal for MARL is data efficiency -- sampling from vast state and action spaces that grow exponentially with the number of agents potentially leads to the curse of multiagency. However, current provably data-efficient algorithms for RMGs are limited to tabular settings with finite state and action spaces, which are only computationally manageable for small-scale problems, leaving RMGs with large-scale (or infinite) state spaces largely unexplored. The only existing work beyond tabular settings focuses on linear function approximation (LFA) for a restrictive class of RMGs using vanish minimal value assumption and still suffers from sample complexity with the curse of multiagency. In this work, we focuses on general RMGs with LFA. For uncertainty sets defined by total variation distance, we develop provably data-efficient algorithms that break the curse of multiagency in both the generative model setting and a newly proposed online interactive setting. To our knowledge, our results are the first to break the curse of multiagency of sample complexity for RMGs with large (possibly infinite) state spaces, regardless of the uncertainty set construction.
Deploying multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in the real world is often limited by model mismatches between the training simulators and the true environment, which could be further amplified through strategic interactions and result in severe performance degradation upon deployment. Distributional robustness offers a principled response by optimizing policies against worst-case transition models drawn from an uncertainty set, but standard robust MARL frameworks become increasingly intractable as the number of agents grows. This paper develops an infinite-horizon, stationary mean-field game framework that incorporates distributional model uncertainty directly into the population-coupled dynamics. We establish a robust dynamic programming principle with a contractive Bellman operator and prove the existence of a stationary robust mean-field equilibrium via a fixed-point argument. We further develop the first concrete algorithm with convergence guarantees. We then connect the mean-field solution to a finite-population robust game whose ambiguity sets depend on the empirical distribution, showing that the mean-field equilibrium policy induces approximate equilibrium behavior as the population size increases. Under a contractive robust-dynamics regime, we further obtain explicit non-asymptotic error bounds. Numerical experiments further illustrate the qualitative and quantitative impact of robustness under multiple uncertainty models, validating our theoretical findings.
We propose and study distributionally robust Markov games (DR-MGs) with the average-reward criterion as a crucial framework for multi-agent decision-making under model mismatches and over extended horizons. Under a standard irreducible assumption, we first derive a correspondence between the optimal policies and the solutions of the robust Bellman equation, based on which we further show the existence of a stationary Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game. We further study DR-MGs under a more general weakly communicating setting. We construct a set-valued map based on the constant-gain optimal robust Bellman operator and show that its value is a subset of the best-response policies. We further prove that this map admits a fixed point, which implies the existence of NE. We then design two algorithms, Robust Nash-Iteration and robust TD Descent, with provably convergent guarantees. Finally, we show that the NE under average-reward can be approximated by the ones for the discounted DR-MGs as the discount factor approaches one. Our studies provide a comprehensive theoretical and algorithmic foundation for decision-making in complex, uncertain, and long-running multi-player environments.
A key challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) lies in designing learning signals that effectively promote coordination among agents. Designing such signals requires estimating how one agent's current action affects its teammates over future interaction steps. To address this, we introduce Multi-step Advantage-Gated Interventional Causal MARL (MAGIC), a framework that estimates multi-step action effects between agents and selectively converts them into intrinsic rewards. MAGIC uses counterfactual action interventions to compare teammate futures under factual and counterfactual branches, and introduces a gate based on advantage to direct exploration toward beneficial behaviors aligned with the task goal. Experiments on Multi-Agent Particle Environments (MPE) and StarCraft micromanagement benchmarks (SMAC and SMACv2) show that MAGIC consistently outperforms leading prior methods, with average relative final performance improvements of 26.9% and 10.1%, respectively.