Knowing but Not Correcting: Routine Task Requests Suppress Factual Correction in LLMs
Authors: Zixuan Chen, Hao Lin, Zizhe Chen, Yizhou Tian, Garry Yang, Depeng Wang, Ya Guo, Huijia Zhu, +1 more
Organizations: 1Shanghai Jiao Tong University · 2The Chinese University of Hong Kong · 3Ant Group
Abstract
LLMs reliably correct false claims when presented in isolation, yet when the same claims are embedded in task-oriented requests, they often comply rather than correct. We term this failure mode \emph{correction suppression} and construct a benchmark of 300 false premises to systematically evaluate it across eight models. Suppression rates range from 19% to 90%, with four models exceeding 80%, establishing correction suppression as a prevalent and severe phenomenon. Mechanistic analysis reveals that suppression is not a knowledge failure: the model registers the error internally but task context diverts early-layer attention from the false claim as output intent crystallizes toward compliance at middle layers. We characterize this as \emph{knowing but not correcting} -- suppression occurs at response selection rather than knowledge encoding. Guided by this mechanism, we propose two training-free interventions. Correction Direction Steering (CDS) estimates a correction-compliance direction from matched pairs and injects it at middle layers before output intent crystallizes. Dynamic Payload Amplification (DPA) localizes payload tokens via attention divergence between early and late layers and amplifies their representation at the final layer, requiring no calibration data. Experiments on Qwen3.5-9B and LLaMA3.1-8B show both methods substantially improve factual strictness. CDS achieves the highest correction rate on Qwen3.5-9B (0%→58.2%). DPA is the only method that preserves or improves reasoning capability on both models. These findings introduce \emph{factual strictness} -- the willingness to uphold accuracy against contextual pressures -- as a new dimension of model reliability.
Recent work shows that LLM agents struggle to correct errors in their own reasoning traces yet show markedly higher correction rates when identical claims appear under external sources. We ask whether this asymmetry reflects a capability deficit or a role-label artifact: does an agent's willingness to correct a wrong claim depend causally on the chat-template role that carries it, rather than on the claim's content? Our setup keeps the erroneous claim byte-identical across all conditions (SHA-256 verified) and varies only its wrapping role: the agent's own \role{<thought>}, a \role{user} message, a \role{tool} response, or a \role{system <memory>} block. Across 13 model-domain cells covering seven model families and three domains (n=30 paired tasks per cell), relabeling the claim from \role{<thought>} to an external role lifts the explicit-correction rate by 23 to 93 percentage points, with 10 of 13 cells reaching p<0.001. Further experiments confirm that the effect is asymmetric, mechanistically decomposable, and robust across domains. The failure to self-correct is not a cognitive deficit; it is a chat-template artifact. We exploit this artifact by designing a prompt-structure-only intervention that requires no training and no model modification, with its strongest role label being domain-dependent: \role{<memory>} dominates on math, while a plain \role{user} message dominates on logical deduction.
Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.
A model should refuse two different things: answers it would get wrong, and questions it should not answer at all, such as unanswerable ones or ones resting on a false premise. The usual recipe thresholds a single confidence score, which cannot tell these apart. Across five instruction-tuned models from three families (2B to 14B), we find they are separate axes. Ordinary answer-confidence tracks whether an answer is right but is nearly blind to whether the question is answerable; a linear probe on hidden states does the reverse. The blind spot does not shrink with scale. It is worst on naturally occurring false-premise questions (CREPE). There, answer-confidence, P(IK), P(True), and even asking the model outright whether a premise is false all stay near chance, while a hidden-state probe reaches 0.69 to 0.77 AUROC: the model represents a problem it will not report. This turns out to be fixable. Instructing a model to check premises backfires, because it then disputes sound and false premises alike (57% false challenges), unable to tell them apart; routing the same instruction with the probe roughly triples challenge precision. We turn the two axes into a calibrated policy that answers only when an answerability score and a correctness score each clear a separately certifies behave differently: the unanswerable-answer rate is controllable at every scale, while the wrong-answer rate is capped by model accuracy, so the guarantee tightens as threshold policy certifies both budgets at 0.75 coverage of correct answers, against 0.31 for a single threshold; at 14B it is the only policy that certifies at all.