Fine-Tuning Small Language Models for Solution-Oriented Windows Event Log Analysis

Deploying large language models (LLMs) for decision support in emergency departments (EDs) faces two major challenges: privacy risks of transmitting patient data to closed-source commercial LLMs and the lack of systematic evaluation of fine-tuning strategies for locally deployable open-source small language models (SLMs). We benchmarked eight open-source SLMs using zero-shot prompting, prefix tuning, Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA), and full fine-tuning on three ED tasks: triage level prediction, specialist referral recommendation, and diagnosis prediction. Using 2,083 MIMIC-IV-ED cases and Claude Haiku 4.5 and Claude Sonnet 4.5 as baselines, we found that LoRA fine-tuned open-source SLMs outperform commercial baselines on triage level prediction and specialist referral recommendation, while diagnosis prediction remains challenging for open-source SLMs. Confusion matrix analysis further shows that fine-tuned open-source SLMs can detect highest-severity patients missed by the commercial baselines. These results demonstrate that locally deployable SLMs can achieve clinically competitive performance for ED decision support.

Malware analysis demands rapid interpretation of complex detonation reports spanning filesystem, network, and process behaviours. While large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities for technical artifact interpretation, the opacity and escalating API costs of closed-weight frontier models motivate exploration of open-weight alternatives. However, many open-weight models are large, demanding significant compute resources and incurring non-trivial hosting costs that place them beyond reach for resource-constrained deployments. This paper investigates whether orchestrated ensembles of small language models (SLMs) can match or exceed single LLM performance on structured questions about malware detonation reports. We established baselines by testing eleven open-weight SLMs, three cyber security pre-trained models, and six frontier LLMs on Meta's CyberSecEval Malware Analysis benchmark. We then designed and evaluated four orchestration architectures: (i) a multi-agent pipeline that decomposes analysis into structured evidence-collection and reasoning stages, (ii) an adversarial debate framework in which two agents iteratively critique each other's reasoning, (iii) a hierarchical consultation system that pairs a general-purpose SLM with a cyber-specialised expert model, and (iv) a hybrid architecture that combines evidence-grounded pipelines with adversarial debate reasoning. The hybrid system (Qwen3-4B with Foundation-Sec-8B) achieved 35.30% overall accuracy, exceeding the strongest cyber-specialised baseline (22.54%) and the strongest ungrounded frontier baseline (34.77%); when given the same evidence pipeline, grounded Gemini remained the strongest configuration at 38.22%. These findings show that evidence-grounded orchestration can substantially improve the performance of collaborative SLMs for supporting interpretation of malware detonation reports.

This paper presents AuditBench, a new benchmark dataset for evaluating the capabilities of LLMs at investigating security-related system audit logs. We design and use this benchmark to explore the performance of LLMs on four log-investigation tasks that incident response teams commonly perform, ranging from triaging alerts generated by detectors to identifying persistence mechanisms on compromised systems. AuditBench consists of system audit logs collected from Linux and Windows machines, and spans over 50 different security investigation scenarios, including both malicious and benign activity. Using our benchmark, we evaluate and analyze the performance of five frontier LLMs at analyzing audit logs for attack investigations. Our analysis illuminates how LLM performance and error profiles vary according to different design choices, such as differences in model size, data representation, prompt construction, and specific investigation tasks. Additionally, we characterize the quality of the explanations produced by LLMs and the types of errors that models make across our benchmark. Collectively, our work provides a foundation for assessing the capabilities of LLMs for investigating security logs, novel insights for practitioners using LLMs in security operations, and important directions for future research.