On Privacy Leakage in Tabular Diffusion Models: Influential Factors, Attacker Knowledge, and Metrics

Diffusion models are the leading approach for tabular data synthesis and are increasingly used to share sensitive records. Whether they actually protect privacy has become a pressing question. Membership inference attacks are the standard tool for this purpose, yet existing attacks assume a single-table setting and ignore the multi-relational structure of real sensitive data. A core challenge in assessing privacy risks from membership inference attacks in multi-table settings is how to leverage auxiliary information from relations associated with the target table, such as its parent tables. Particularly, we study a practical setting in which such auxiliary information is available only when training the attack model. At inference time, the attacker observes only the attribute values of the target record from the target table. We propose FERMI (FEature-mapping for Relational Membership Inference), which resolves this gap by enriching single-table features with relational membership signal. Across three tabular diffusion architectures and three real-world relational datasets, FERMI consistently improves attack performance over single-table baselines, with TPR@$0.1$FPR rising by up to 53% over the single-table baseline in the white-box setting and 22% in the black-box setting.

Tabular synthesis is critical for privacy-preserving sharing and augmentation, yet diffusion models rely on implicit mechanisms to capture inter-column relationships. We introduce Geometry-Aware Tabular Diffusion (GATD), which augments tabular diffusion denoisers with pairwise angles and lengths computed from column value differences and used as inputs and auxiliary targets. Our MLP instantiation achieves state-of-the-art benchmark performance while using 3.5x fewer parameters on average (up to 25x for classification tasks): on ten datasets, it wins 8/10 Shape, 7/10 Trend, and 9/10 downstream utility (F1/RMSE), reducing Shape and Trend error by 27% and 20%. Default loss weights transfer to GNN and Transformer denoisers, improving Shape on 27/30 and Trend on 25/30 architecture-dataset cells. A matched ablation shows supervision (not extra inputs or capacity) drives the gain. This shows explicit relational supervision is a portable inductive bias for tabular diffusion.

Tabular data sharing under privacy constraints is increasingly important for research and collaboration. Synthetic data generators (SDGs) are a promising solution, but synthetic data remains vulnerable to attacks, such as membership inference attacks (MIAs), which aim to determine whether a specific record was part of the training data. State-of-the-art MIAs are powerful but impractical: they rely on shadow modeling, requiring hundreds of SDG training runs, and need auxiliary data several times larger than the original training set. Fast proxy metrics like distance to closest record (DCR) are efficient but have limited sensitivity to MIA risk. We introduce ReMIA (Relative Membership Inference Attack), a practical privacy metric that requires only two SDG training runs and additional data no larger than the original training set. Rather than predicting whether a record was in the training set, ReMIA generates two synthetic datasets from two source datasets and measures whether a classifier can identify which source a record came from. Experiments across multiple tabular datasets and SDGs show that ReMIA has a sensitivity comparable to state-of-the-art MIAs while being substantially more practical. We further observe that SDGs can achieve privacy-utility trade-offs that traditional noise-based anonymization methods do not match. Code is available at https://github.com/aindo-com/remia.