The Position Curse: LLMs Struggle to Locate the Last Few Items in a List

We identify a previously overlooked failure mode of ALiBi positional encoding: its linear bias scaling underflows floating-point precision, which zeroes out a large fraction of attention weights and renders the affected attention heads partially blind. We analyze this failure mode, characterize its impact, and examine four mitigation strategies. We further demonstrate its occurrence in state-of-the-art pretrained models based on ALiBi. Comprehensive pretraining experiments with 148M-parameter decoder models help us to disentangle its effects from out-of-context degradation. We find that ALiBi's failure mode can substantially impair token retrieval while having only a minor effect on standard decoder benchmarks. We propose four training-time mitigation strategies and evaluate them individually and in combinations, finding that log-scaled distances yield the most consistent improvements in passkey retrieval. Despite this problem, default ALiBi slopes remain a surprisingly strong baseline, particularly for needle-in-a-haystack retrieval. Based on these findings we provide concrete recommendations on how to train models with ALiBi.

Standard accuracy metrics cannot explain why LLMs handle variable tracking but fail on semantically equivalent loops. We study an internal lifecycle of code reasoning in which models first brew the answer, making it linearly recoverable many layers before it becomes self-decodable, and then diverge into one of four resolution outcomes: Resolved, Overprocessed, Misresolved, or Unresolved. Understanding this lifecycle matters because similar task accuracies can mask fundamentally different failure modes that surface-level evaluation cannot detect. We introduce a dual diagnostic framework pairing layer-wise linear probing with Context-Stripped Decoding (CSD) and apply it to six code-reasoning task families across 16 models spanning Qwen, Llama, and DeepSeek architectures. All four outcomes carry substantial mass in every task family: overall Resolved is only 41.5%, with multiple tasks below 30%. Controlled sweeps over structure, depth, and operators expose task-specific failure bottlenecks: Function Call Resolved plunges from 61.1% to 2.5% as call depth increases from one to three. Across architectures and scales, the brewing scaffold remains stable, with normalized brewing duration 24-42% across all 16 models, while resolution success varies with capability. This indicates that the scaffold is a stable empirical regularity across the tested decoder-only Transformer families, whereas resolution success covaries with capability, scale, and training. Code: https://github.com/euyis1019/llm-brewing

Large language models (LLMs) used as listwise rerankers in recommendation systems suffer from position bias when serializing candidate sets into prompts. We show this order sensitivity creates an exploitable attack surface: an attacker can promote a label-0 target into the top-$k$ solely by reordering candidates, without changing item content, labels, or model parameters. We introduce $\mathrm{promo}@k$ to quantify this vulnerability, measuring the fraction of label-0 targets that can be elevated into top-$k$ rankings via permutation. Evaluating across three domains (MovieLens, Amazon Books, and Amazon Fashion), $\mathrm{promo}@5$ reaches up to 0.57 at an attack budget of $R$ = 50 orderings. Furthermore, ordinary permutation stability predicts vulnerability without running the attack. While a bidirectional T5 encoder scorer reduces exposure, permutation-consistency regularization and architectural invariance effectively mitigate it. Pointwise scoring avoids the bias issue but degrades ranking quality. These results demonstrate that input candidate order in listwise LLM reranking is a security-relevant attack vector. Code and data are available at https://github.com/geoz-lab/position_bias_attack.