Are certain cognitive biases mathematically inevitable consequences of sequential information processing? We prove that primacy effects, anchoring, and order-dependence are architecturally necessary in autoregressive language models due to causal masking constraints. Our three impossibility theorems establish: (1) primacy bias arises from asymmetric attention accumulation; (2) anchoring emerges from sequential conditioning with provable information bounds; and (3) exact debiasing by permutation marginalization requires factorial-time computation, with Monte Carlo approximation feasible at constant per-tolerance overhead. We validate these bounds across 12 frontier LLMs (R2=0.89; ΔBIC =16.6 vs. next-best alternative). We then derive quantitative predictions from the framework and test them in two pre-registered human experiments (N=464 analyzed). Study 1 confirms anchor position modulates anchoring magnitude (d=0.52, BF10=847). Study 2 shows working memory load amplifies primacy bias (d=0.41, BF10=156), with WM capacity predicting bias reduction (r=−.38). These convergent findings reframe cognitive biases as resource-rational responses to sequential processing.
Positional biases such as recency and primacy effects have been documented in large language models (LLMs), yet the underlying mechanism by which these models make their evaluations remains poorly understood. Both primacy and recency biases have been observed in human judgments in response to evidence, but recent work suggest that \emph{when} the listener updates their beliefs -- during the presentation of evidence or only at the end -- influences the presence of such effects. We investigate whether a similar phenomenon holds for LLMs, finding divergence from human behavior. These biases are more exacerbated in newer models compared to their predecessors.
Jasin Cekinmez, Addison J. Wu, Thomas L. Griffiths
We investigate the extent to which the language processing of LLMs resembles human cognitive processes, focusing on a human cognitive bias called the neglect-zero effect. This effect refers to the human tendency to ignore zero-models, which are configurations that render a proposition vacuously true by virtue of an empty set. We focus on two types of inferences driven by the neglect-zero effect, and examine how LLMs process these inferences by comparing their behavior with that in an inference that does not involve the neglect-zero effect. For this purpose, we employ a paradigm based on structural priming, where recent exposure to a preceding sentence (the prime) facilitates the processing of a subsequent sentence (the target) due to their structural similarity. We prepare primes to force LLMs to consider the zero-model, and analyze whether they also consider it in the target. The results suggest that the neglect-zero effect may not occur in the LLMs analyzed in this study. Our code is available at https://github.com/ynklab/neglect_zero
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) generate chain-of-thought traces whose length tracks human reaction times across cognitive tasks, but recent debate questions whether this alignment reflects genuine computational structure or surface verbosity. We test whether the alignment varies with inference-time reasoning effort. Across GPT-OSS-20B and GPT-OSS-120B, three effort levels, and six reasoning tasks, within-task and cross-task alignment remain invariant: Bayes Factors lean toward the null, and mean alignment is numerically near-identical across conditions. A manipulation check reveals that the effort parameter sets an upper budget on generation rather than driving real-time allocation, suggesting that the allocation policy is crystallized at training time. Arithmetic complexity contrasts further show that token allocation tracks fine-grained, format-dependent human difficulty patterns, with model scale improving the match. Cognitive cost alignment between LRMs and humans appears to be a training-time achievement, robust to inference-time perturbations, supporting a compiled rather than online account of LRM problem-solving.