Conformity Generates Collective Misalignment in AI Agents Societies

AI agents increasingly operate as part of interacting systems rather than in isolation. As agents exchange information and jointly make decisions, their interactions can improve collective reasoning but may also produce herding, polarization, or amplify shared biases. Understanding and predicting these collective dynamics is therefore important for designing effective and aligned multi-agent systems. Here, we study over 10,000 communities of language-model agents that repeatedly exchange messages and revise their opinions across objective mathematics questions and subjective political statements. Despite substantial diversity in possible behavior, the individual and group dynamics can be represented by three characteristic regimes: indifference, polarization, and consensus. AI agents start indifferent and build conviction as they interact. On objective questions, communication improves collective accuracy, while on subjective questions it often drifts group opinions toward the right in the political spectrum. We explain these observations with a statistical-mechanics formalism in which agents stochastically favor lower social pressure. Given only initial opinions, our model predicts individual trajectories, outperforms all standard baselines, generalizes to unseen community graphs, and reproduces the observed group archetype distributions. Our fitted model parameters reveal the mechanics underlying our key observations: i) communities operate below the critical social temperature, which explains conviction buildup; ii) attractive ties outweigh repulsive ones, which favors consensus; and iii) agents holding the correct answer exert the strongest pull, which drives truth-seeking. Overall, our results demonstrate that collective behavior of AI agents, like that of other complex systems, follows compact and predictive dynamical laws.

As large language models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents in high-stakes decisions, the AI safety community assumes that safety properties of individual models will compose into safe multi-agent behavior. This position paper argues that this assumption is fundamentally mistaken. In agentic AI, safety is determined by interaction topology, not model weights. When agents deliberate sequentially or aggregate via parallel voting with a judge, the structure of information flow and decision coupling dominates outcomes. Evidence across model families and scales reveals three persistent topology-driven pathologies: ordering instability, where system behavior depends primarily on agent sequence; information cascades, where early judgments propagate regardless of correctness; and functional collapse, where systems satisfy fairness metrics while abandoning meaningful risk discrimination. Contrary to intuition, scaling to more capable models strengthens these effects by increasing consensus formation and reducing the challenge of initial decisions. These failure modes are invisible to model-centric evaluation and alignment procedures. We argue that agentic AI must be treated as a dynamical system rather than a collection of aligned components. Interaction topology must become a primary target of safety evaluation and regulation, with systems required to demonstrate robustness across architectural variations before deployment.

A leading proposal for aligning artificial superintelligence (ASI) is to use AI agents to automate an increasing fraction of alignment research as capabilities improve. We argue that, even when research agents are not scheming to deliberately sabotage alignment work, this plan could produce compelling but catastrophically misleading safety assessments resulting in the unintentional deployment of misaligned AI. This could happen because alignment research involves many hard-to-supervise fuzzy tasks (tasks without clear evaluation criteria, for which human judgement is systematically flawed). Consequently, research outputs will contain systematic, undetected errors, and even correct outputs could be incorrectly aggregated into overconfident safety assessments. This problem is likely to be worse for automated alignment research than for human-generated alignment research for several reasons: 1) optimisation pressure means agent-generated mistakes are concentrated among those that human reviewers are least likely to catch; 2) agents are likely to produce errors that do not resemble human mistakes; 3) AI-generated alignment solutions may involve arguments humans cannot evaluate; and 4) shared weights, data and training processes may make AI outputs more correlated than human equivalents. Therefore, agents must be trained to reliably perform hard-to-supervise fuzzy tasks. Generalisation and scalable oversight are the leading candidates for achieving this but both face novel challenges in the context of automated alignment.