The Point of No Return: Counterfactual Localization of Deceptive Commitment in Language-Model Reasoning
Authors: Scott Merrill, Shashank Srivastava
Organizations: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Abstract
Existing deception datasets label completed outputs as honest or deceptive, treating deception as a property of the final response rather than a function of the model's reasoning trace. This obscures a more fundamental question: when does a language model become committed to deception? We introduce counterfactual localization: for each sentence prefix in a reasoning trace, we fix the prefix, resample continuations, and estimate the probability of a deceptive outcome. To scale this, we construct five environments (spanning strategic bluffing, maze guidance, financial advice, used-car sales, and offer negotiation) in which deception is never prompted but emerges from strategic incentives and labels follow mechanically from environment state rather than subjective human judgment. The resulting corpus localizes ∼1.46M sentences across four reasoning models, drawn from over 94.1M sampled continuations, 91.5B generated tokens, and over 100K scenarios. Sentence-level human evaluation confirms that detected commitment points correspond to interpretable shifts in decision state. Using this resource, we show that lexical cues for commitment prediction transfer poorly across environments, whereas attention-based transition features generalize out of distribution, suggesting that deceptive commitment is reflected in reusable changes in reasoning dynamics rather than surface form. We further identify compact attention-head sets (under 10% of heads) that, selected on one environment, causally suppress deceptive commitment across held-out environments. We release the corpus as a substrate for studying deception, and more broadly commitment, in language-model reasoning.
Research and news coverage of language-model deception increasingly attributes human-like mental-state concepts to language models. Such claims can blur the distinction between behavior that looks deceptive and a mechanism that is actually deceptive. We introduce a causal taxonomy separating prior commitment from retrospective report, model preference from realized output, false preference from sensitivity to the utility of misleading a recipient, and deceptive behavior from the provenance of the objective or strategy producing it. We test these distinctions in two open-weight model families. Across controlled guessing-game and stock-trading experiments, we find that deceptive-looking behavior can arise without the corresponding proposed mechanism, while other interventions provide direct evidence that recipient information state can causally affect deceptive preference. These results show that deceptive behavior can provide evidence for a deceptive mechanism. But even evidence for such a mechanism does not establish model agency in the deception.
Large Language Models (LLMs) are effective at deceiving when prompted to do so. Models that demonstrate better performance on reasoning tasks are also better at prompted deception. But under what conditions do they deceive without instruction to do so? This study evaluates unsolicited deception produced by LLMs in a preregistered experimental protocol using tools from signaling theory. We evaluated a range of 18 proprietary closed-source and open-source LLMs using modified 2x2 games (in the style of the Prisoner's Dilemma) augmented with a phase in which they can freely communicate to the other agent using unconstrained language. This setup creates an opportunity to misrepresent its actions in conditions that vary in how useful doing so might be towards goal satisfaction. The results indicate that 1) all tested LLMs misrepresent their actions in at least some conditions, 2) they are generally more likely to do so in situations in which deception is beneficial, and 3) models exhibiting better reasoning capacity overall tend to misrepresent at higher rates. Taken together, these results suggest a correlational relationship between model reasoning performance and situational deception, and reveal certain contextual factors that affect whether LLMs will misrepresent actions or not in a novel experimental configuration.
A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.