Artificial Intelligence can Recognize Whether a Job Applicant is Selling and/or Lying According to Facial Expressions and Head Movements Much More Correctly Than Human Interviewers
Authors: Hung-Yue Suen, Kuo-En Hung, Che-Wei Liu, Yu-Sheng Su, Han-Chih Fan
Abstract
Whether an interviewee's honest and deceptive responses can be detected by facial expression signals in videos has been debated and requires further research. We developed deep learning models enabled by computer vision to extract temporal patterns of job applicants' facial expressions and head movements to identify self-reported honest and deceptive impression management (IM) tactics from video frames in real asynchronous video interviews. A 12- to 15-minute video was recorded for each of N=121 job applicants as they answered five structured behavioral interview questions. Each applicant completed a survey to self-evaluate their trustworthiness on four IM measures. Additionally, a field experiment was conducted to compare the concurrent validity associated with self-reported IMs between our modeling approach and human interviewers. Human interviewers' performance in predicting these IM measures from another subset of 30 videos was obtained by having N=30 human interviewers evaluate three recordings. Our models explained 91% and 84% of the variance in honest and deceptive IMs, respectively, and showed stronger correlations with self-reported IM scores than human interviewers.
Deepfake detection research has largely converged on deep learning approaches that, despite strong benchmark performance, offer limited insight into what distinguishes real from manipulated facial behavior. This study presents an interpretable alternative grounded in bio-behavioral features of facial dynamics and evaluates how computational detection strategies relate to human perceptual judgments. We identify core low-dimensional patterns of facial movement, from which temporal features characterizing spatiotemporal structure were derived. Traditional machine learning classifiers trained on these features achieved modest but significant above-chance deepfake classification, driven by higher-order temporal irregularities that were more pronounced in manipulated than real facial dynamics. Notably, detection was substantially more accurate for videos containing emotive expressions than those without. An emotional valence classification analysis further indicated that emotive signals are systematically degraded in deepfakes, explaining the differential impact of emotive dynamics on detection. Furthermore, we provide an additional and often overlooked dimension of explainability by assessing the relationship between model decisions and human perceptual detection. Model and human judgments converged for emotive but diverged for non-emotive videos, and even where outputs aligned, underlying detection strategies differed. These findings demonstrate that face-swapped deepfakes carry a measurable behavioral fingerprint, most salient during emotional expression. Additionally, model-human comparisons suggest that interpretable computational features and human perception may offer complementary rather than redundant routes to detection.
Timothy Joseph Murphy, Jennifer Cook, Hélio Clemente José Cuve
Frontier multimodal models can guess whether a person is lying from a testimony video. To do so, they stream that raw face and voice to a third-party model. We ask whether the heavy media is needed at all. On the Real-life Trial Deception dataset, Whissle on-device speech and vision stack extracts a compact digest: transcript, emotion, age, gender, intent distributions, a deception intent filter, fluency and rhythm, per-frame facial behaviour, and prosody. Under speaker-independent evaluation, we report three findings. A small classifier on this digest reaches AUC 0.741, matching Gemini 2.5 Pro on full video. Handing the digest to a frontier LLM reaches AUC 0.755 with Claude Opus 4.8 at 7.8X fewer input tokens, with no media leaving the device. The reported 75% accuracy is a speaker-leakage artifact. We release code and experiments.
A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.