Organizations: Shenzhen Institute for Advanced Study, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making. Inspired by the theory of \emph{inattentional blindness} in human cognition, we investigate whether LLMs, trained on human-preferred corpora that embed attentional biases, exhibit a similar limitation: \emph{failing to attend to subtle yet important contextual cues under explicit task instructions}. To evaluate this, we introduce the task of \textbf{explicit-implicit reasoning} and present \textbf{MixRea}, a benchmark of 2,246 multiple-choice questions across 9 reasoning types with varying distributions of explicit and implicit information. Evaluation of 21 advanced LLMs shows that even the best-performing reasoning model (Gemini 2.5 Pro) achieves only 42.8% consistency, revealing widespread inattentional blindness. To mitigate this, we propose \textbf{Potential Relation Completion Prompting (PRCP)}, a prompting method that improves reasoning by recovering overlooked causal relations. Further analysis shows that this limitation persists across diverse multi-source reasoning tasks, highlighting the need for more cognitively aligned models.
As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in complex reasoning tasks, they have learned to heavily prioritize explicit conditions provided in the input. However, in everyday commonsense reasoning, this mechanism exposes a critical vulnerability which we term Salience Bias: models become easily hijacked by useless explicit distractors (e.g., numerical values), leading them to ignore the implicit physical or commonsense prerequisites of a task. A critical open question is whether this failure reflects a genuine gap in commonsense knowledge or merely its suppression under misleading task framing. To investigate this, we construct the SaliTrap Benchmark, a high-quality dataset across four trap dimensions. Evaluating 12 state-of-the-art LLMs, we find that all mainstream models suffer significantly from salience bias, with severity scaling with distractor density and detecting the trap often decoupled from actually avoiding it. Crucially, by re-eliciting the same models with the task framing stripped away, we show that this is overwhelmingly a failure of \textbf{knowledge suppression rather than knowledge absence}: a context-free knowledge probe alone recovers over 90% of sycophantic-compliance failures, revealing that the requisite commonsense is intrinsically present but actively crowded out by salient distractors that lure the model into over-compliant, unnecessary computation. Building on this diagnosis, we further show that lightweight, inference-time prompting alone substantially closes the gap without any retraining. Our findings relocate the bottleneck of commonsense reasoning failures from model competence to elicitation, and we release SaliTrap as a testbed for this blind spot. The codes are available at https://github.com/Wuzheng02/SaliTrap.
We introduce a multi-turn interactive framework for reasoning evaluation that treats reasoning as active evidence acquisition and belief updating. Wherein, LLMs receive only the task rules, must issue targeted queries to a hidden environment, integrate partial observations over time, and decide when to submit a final answer. Beyond standard success rate and interaction efficiency, we evaluate contextual robustness under controlled contextual perturbations, and metacognitive adaptation through counterfactual revision and necessity judgment. We instantiate the framework as a benchmark of 474 executable games, each evaluated under five fixed configuration search spaces corresponding to five difficulty levels, and evaluate a broad set of frontier LLMs. Results show that the benchmark is highly discriminative, exposing large differences not only in success rate but also in interaction efficiency. Moreover, we empirically show that contextual perturbations cause moderate but consistent declines, whereas counterfactual revision and necessity judgment lead to much larger drops.
Should we trust Large Language Models (LLMs) with high accuracy? LLMs achieve high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks, but correctness alone does not reveal the quality of the reasoning used to produce it. This highlights a fundamental limitation of outcome-based evaluation: models may arrive at correct answers through flawed reasoning, and models with substantially different reasoning capabilities can nevertheless exhibit similar benchmark accuracy, for example due to memorization or over-optimization. In this paper, we ask: given existing benchmarks, can we move beyond outcome-based evaluation to assess the quality of reasoning itself? We seek metrics that (1) differentiate models with similar accuracy and (2) are robust to variations in input prompts and generation configurations. To this end, we propose a reasoning score that evaluates reasoning traces along dimensions such as faithfulness, coherence, utility, and factuality. A remaining question is how to aggregate this score across multiple sampled traces. Naively averaging them is undesirable, particularly in long-horizon settings, where the number of possible trajectories grows rapidly, and low-confidence correct traces are more likely to be coincidental. To address this, we introduce the Filtered Reasoning Score (FRS), which computes reasoning quality using only the top-K% most confident traces. Evaluating with FRS, models that are indistinguishable under standard accuracy exhibit significant differences in reasoning quality. Moreover, models with higher FRS on one benchmark tend to perform better on other reasoning benchmarks, in both accuracy and reasoning quality. Together, these findings suggest that FRS complements accuracy by capturing a model's transferable reasoning capabilities. We open source our evaluation codebase: https://github.com/Manas2006/benchmark_reproducibility.