Reasoning-Trace Collapse: Evaluating the Loss of Explicit Reasoning During Fine-Tuning

Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on a small, high-quality set of long reasoning traces is an effective approach for eliciting strong reasoning capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, existing methods for curating high-quality SFT data rely heavily on strong reasoning models to filter examples based on diversity and difficulty, making the curation process costly while often yielding suboptimal data quality. In this work, we show that diverse and challenging reasoning examples can be identified using only the initial reasoning tokens. Specifically, we demonstrate that difficult problems can be reliably detected based on the loss of the first 100 reasoning tokens evaluated at a randomly perturbed checkpoint of the pretrained model. We further show that examples exhibiting similar loss patterns over their first 1k reasoning tokens across a small number of perturbed checkpoints extrapolating along the fine-tuning trajectory provably induce similar gradients. We validate our approach through extensive experiments on fine-tuning Qwen2.5-7B and Llama3.1-8B models on the M23K medical reasoning and OpenThoughts-Math datasets. Our method outperforms existing baselines by up to 1.7% while being 91% more token efficient.

A standard recipe for distilling the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) is to sample chains of thought from the model, keep those that reach the correct final answer, and fine-tune on the survivors. When sampling fails, a common fix shows the generator the gold answer and asks it to write a chain that reaches that answer. We show that this second step degrades the training data in a way that correctness filtering cannot catch. We run a controlled experiment that fixes the generator, the problem set, and the correctness filter, and varies only whether the chain is generated under answer-conditioning, the gold answer shown with a request to reach it. Training a strong instruction-tuned reasoning model on its own answer-conditioned chains sharply lowers its verifiable-reasoning accuracy. The loss grows with difficulty, reaching as much as about 27 points on the hardest competition problems. The mechanism is legible in the chains themselves, which rationalize backward from the shown answer instead of deriving it, with the early final-answer statement as the measurable symptom. The harm is a property of the data rather than the generator, read off unlabeled generations before any fine-tuning, ordering the penalty across eight thinking models from four families, and transferring across teacher families. A prompt ablation localizes it to the rationalize-toward instruction rather than the answer's bare visibility. The practical takeaway is to generate answer-blind, because no correctness filter can see this damage in the data.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.