Abstract
Modern DNNs are repeatedly fine-tuned to incorporate new data and functionality. This evolutionary workflow introduces a security risk when updated data cannot be fully trusted, as adversaries may implant Trojans during fine-tuning. We present MIST, a Trojan detection approach that analyzes how a model's internal representations change during fine-tuning. Rather than attempting to reconstruct trigger conditions, MIST characterizes benign model evolution using pre-activation spectra and flags updates whose spectral deviations are inconsistent with this reference. This framing treats Trojan detection as a regression problem over model updates. An empirical evaluation across four datasets and eight Trojan attacks shows that spectral distances reliably distinguish Trojaned updates from clean fine-tuning. MIST outperforms state-of-the-art detection accuracy after a single update, without requiring any knowledge about the poisoned data or the trigger, and remains effective under multi-step benign evolution, with graceful and bounded degradation. These results indicate that spectral evolution provides a stable and assumption-light signal for detecting malicious model updates.
Explore similar work
Apr 6, 2026cs.CR
Fine-tuning is the dominant paradigm for adapting large machine learning models, yet current deployment pipelines provide no way to verify how a released model was updated. In particular, a model provider or auditor cannot check whether a fine-tuned model adheres to a claimed update procedure without access to its parameters. We introduce \emph{fine-tuning integrity} (FTI), a cryptographic objective for verifying that a deployed model differs from a trusted base model only within a declared class of admissible updates. We construct \emph{succinct model difference proofs} (SMDPs), zero-knowledge protocols that certify structured parameter drift without revealing model weights. Our framework supports three fundamental update classes: norm-bounded, low-rank, and sparse drift, covering common fine-tuning methods such as regularized training, LoRA, and prefix tuning. In all cases, proof size and verification cost depend on the structure of the update rather than the number of parameters. We prove soundness, zero-knowledge, and succinctness for each construction, and establish a matching
Ω(n) lower bound showing that structural assumptions are necessary for succinct verification. A prototype evaluation on synthetic benchmarks and GPT-2 fine-tuning demonstrates that proofs remain compact and verification is efficient at realistic scales.
Zhenhang Shang, Yingzhe Yu, Kani Chen
May 31, 2026cs.LG
Emergent misalignment (EM) occurs when narrow finetuning causes a model to behave dangerously outside the finetuning task. Standard training signals can miss this shift, making reliable detection costly if it depends on repeated behavioral evaluation. We ask whether emergent misalignment can instead be detected from internal representations during finetuning. Using seven alignment-relevant traits encoded as linear directions in activation space, we track representational drift across training checkpoints in four open-source 7-9B LLMs. EM-relevant drift concentrates on a low-dimensional axis that explains 65.5% of the variance, revealing a geometric signature in the studied regime. A low-overhead monitor built on this drift profile detects dangerous checkpoints with 2.2% false negative rate, 2.9% false positive rate, and 0.990 AUROC on held-out perturbation types, outperforming unsupervised PCA and SAE baselines. Stress tests on two 14B models, longer finetuning runs, and misaligned starting points identify key deployment boundaries. These results position trait-space monitoring as a practical complement to behavioral evaluation for EM detection during LoRA-based finetuning, while showing that deployment across substantially different regimes may require recalibration.
Huy Nghiem, Sy-Tuyen Ho, Sarah Wiegreffe +1
Jul 22, 2026cs.LG
Neural network misclassifications exhibit characteristic spectral instability in internal activations that is invisible at the output layer. This phenomenon is identified and formalized as Spectral Drift -- the frequency-domain distance between consecutive layer activations -- with empirical validation showing that failures exhibit significantly higher drift than correct predictions (1.9% increase, p<0.001). This spectral signature emerges during internal processing but becomes masked in final outputs, explaining why confidence-based detection methods struggle. This work introduces Self-Detecting Neural Networks (SDNN), a framework that monitors spectral dynamics across network depth using Short-Time Fourier Transform, wavelet decomposition, and statistical moments to capture multi-scale spectral features. A lightweight detector network (5% parameter overhead) learns to identify failure-indicative patterns via curriculum learning on progressively challenging distributions: natural misclassifications, distribution shifts, and adversarial perturbations. Experiments on CIFAR-10 demonstrate that SDNN achieves 79.0 +/- 25.3% AUROC across three seeds, substantially outperforming confidence-based baselines including MaxSoftmax (50.5%) and Energy Score (52.9%) by approximately 25-30 percentage points. Ablation studies reveal that wavelet decomposition and statistical features make consistent contributions, while STFT's role remains unclear. This work establishes spectral analysis of internal activations as a promising direction for neural network reliability, revealing diagnostic information inaccessible to output-based approaches.
Arunan J