Federated learning faces increasing threats from model poisoning attacks, which harms its application to improve privacy. Existing defense methods typically rely on fixed thresholds or perform clustering with a fixed number of clusters to distinguish malicious gradients from benign ones. However, these methods are difficult to adapt to dynamic poisoning strategies of malicious clients, and often result in the loss of benign gradients due to the heterogeneity of clients' local datasets. To address these problems, we propose a novel robust aggregation method that leverages a small number of known benign clients as references, enabling accurate identification and filtering of malicious gradients while retaining as many benign gradients as possible, even when the number of malicious clients is unknown and variable. First, we introduce a density-based low-dimensional gradient clustering method, which projects gradients onto the two most divergent dimensions and applies density-based clustering to identify malicious gradients while retaining clustered benign gradients and potentially benign outliers. Second, we design an enhancing clustering low-dimensional gradient generator model, which learns to generate pseudo-gradients aligned with the boundary of the benign cluster. These pseudo-gradients act as bridges to connect sparse benign gradient outliers. Third, we introduce low-dimensional gradient re-clustering that clusters the generated pseudo-gradients together with real gradients to recover benign gradients misclassified as noise points, enabling more benign gradients to participate in aggregation. Extensive experiments on the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and MIND datasets demonstrate that our method exhibits superior fidelity and robustness under dynamic poisoning scenarios.
Federated learning has emerged as a decentralized approach for training high-performance models without accessing user data. Despite its effectiveness, it is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious users manipulate the global model by uploading poisoned updates. In this paper, we propose FedReview, a review-based mechanism to identify and dispose the potential poisoned updates in federated learning. Under FedReview, the server randomly assigns a subset of clients as reviewers to evaluate model updates on their training datasets in each round. The reviewers rank the updates based on evaluation results and estimate the number of low-quality updates as potential poisoned ones. Based on the review reports, the server applies a majority voting mechanism to aggregate rankings, which tolerates wrong rankings from malicious reviewers and guides the removal of suspicious updates during model aggregation. In contrast to prior works such as FLTrust, FedReview does not require a server-side validation dataset or prior knowledge of clients, allowing flexible client participation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FedReview enables the server to learn a well-performing global model in adversarial environments.
Federated learning (FL) is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients upload manipulated updates to degrade the performance of the global model. Although detection methods can identify and remove malicious clients, the model remains affected. Retraining from scratch is effective but costly, and existing unlearning methods remain unsatisfactory in both effectiveness and efficiency. We propose Federated Adversarial Unlearning (FAUN), a lightweight framework that retains only a short window of malicious clients' updates and employs adversarial optimization on a proxy dataset to derive updates that eliminate malicious directions. Applying these updates for a few unlearning rounds, followed by benign fine-tuning, enables fast removal of malicious effects and stable recovery. Experiments on three canonical datasets show that FAUN achieves recovery comparable to retraining while requiring far fewer rounds and reduces attack success rates to near zero, confirming FAUN successfully eliminates the contributions of unlearned clients.
Federated learning (FL) is a popular distributed learning paradigm in machine learning, which enables multiple clients to collaboratively train models under the guidance of a server without exposing private client data. However, FL's decentralized nature makes it vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients can submit corrupted models to manipulate the system. To counter such attacks, although various Byzantine-robust methods have been proposed, these methods struggle to provide balanced defense against multiple types of attacks or rely on possessing the dataset in the server. To deal with these drawbacks, thus, we propose an effective multi-layer defensive adaptive aggregation for Bzantine-robust federated learning (AdaBFL) based on a novel three-layer defensive mechanism, which can adaptively adjust the weights of defense algorithms to counter complex attacks. Moreover, we provide convergence properties of our AdaBFL method under the non-convex setting on non-iid data. Comprehensive experiments across multiple datasets validate the superiority of our AdaBFL over the comparable algorithms.