Reward hacking arises when a model improves a proxy reward by exploiting shortcuts rather than solving the intended task. We study this failure mode through the geometry of reinforcement learning updates in language models and argue that hacking emerges when optimization drifts away from a stable low-dimensional learning trajectory. We analyze this drift through dominant singular directions of parameter updates and show that reward-hacking runs exhibit substantially larger directional change than clean runs. Motivated by this observation, we introduce trusted-direction projection, which constrains gradients to remain within a clean reference subspace. Across reward-hacking experiments on mathematical reasoning, the proposed approach delays shortcut exploitation and better preserves task performance.
Reward models are central to large language model (LLM) alignment, but they remain vulnerable to reward hacking. To evaluate reward-model robustness, we introduce RewardHackBench containing 13 reward-hacking patterns covering real life high-stakes domains and general settings, and we find severe failures on specific subcategories across eight reward models. To mitigate these failures, we propose HARVE, a training-free reward-head editing method for scalar reward models. Instead of fine-tuning the reward model, HARVE identifies a multi-directional hacking subspace from residual stream directions associated with selected hacking subcategories, and removes the component of the reward-head vector aligned with that subspace. This directly reduces the reward head's sensitivity to hacking-related features using only a small set of contrastive gold-hacked examples, without gradient updates or fine-tuning. Comprehensive experiments across eight reward models indicates that \model improves hacking robustness, outperforms fine-tuning baselines, and preserves reward-models' general capability. Further analyses suggest that reward hacking is better captured as a multidimensional residual-space structure than by isolated surface cues.
Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) or Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) are two key steps in the post-training of modern Language Models (LMs). A common problem is reward hacking, where the policy may exploit inaccuracies of the reward and learn an unintended behavior. Most previous works address this by limiting the policy update with a Kullback-Leibler (KL) penalty towards a reference model. We propose a different framing: Train the LM in a way that biases policy updates towards regions in which the reward is more accurate. First, we derive a theoretical connection between the accuracy of a reward model and the flatness of an optimum at convergence. Gradient regularization (GR) can then be used to bias training to flatter regions and thereby maintain reward model accuracy. We confirm these results by showing that the gradient norm and reward accuracy are empirically correlated in RLHF. We then empirically show that Reference Resets of the KL penalty find flatter regions with a higher reward accuracy. We further improve on this by proposing to use explicit GR with an efficient finite-difference estimate. Empirically, GR performs better than a KL penalty across a diverse set of RL experiments with LMs. GR achieves a higher GPT-judged win-rate in RLHF, avoids overly focusing on the format in rule-based math rewards, and prevents hacking the judge in LLM-as-a-Judge math tasks.
Johannes Ackermann, Michael Noukhovitch, Takashi Ishida +1
Reward hacking is a form of misalignment in which models overoptimize proxy rewards without genuinely solving the underlying task. Precisely measuring reward hacking occurrence remains challenging because true task rewards are often expensive or impossible to compute. We introduce Countdown-Code, a minimal environment where models can both solve a mathematical reasoning task and manipulate the test harness. This dual-access design creates a clean separation between proxy rewards (test pass/fail) and true rewards (mathematical correctness), enabling accurate measurement of reward-hacking rates. Using this environment, we study reward hacking in open-weight LLMs and find that such behaviors can be unintentionally learned during supervised fine-tuning (SFT) when even a small fraction of reward-hacking trajectories leak into training data. As little as 1% contamination in distillation SFT data is sufficient for models to internalize reward hacking which resurfaces during subsequent reinforcement learning (RL). We further show that RL amplifies misalignment and drives its generalization beyond the original domain. We open-source our environment and code to facilitate future research on reward hacking in LLMs. Our results reveal a previously underexplored pathway through which reward hacking can emerge and persist in LLMs, underscoring the need for more rigorous validation of synthetic SFT data. Code is available at https://github.com/zohaib-khan5040/Countdown-Code.