Foundations of a Time-Consistent Counterfactual Actuarial Runtime for Autonomous AI Agents

Autonomous AI agents increasingly issue side-effect-bearing actions: database mutations, refunds, payments, external commitments. We propose the Actuarial Action Interface (AAI), a deterministic runtime contract that prices each such action against a contractually fixed safe default under a time-consistent risk mapping, and gates execution against a per-boundary reserve capital budget. We then develop the Authority Frontier, an evaluation primitive measuring how much autonomous authority the runtime releases at each level of reserve capital. The framework provides (i) a deterministic quote-bind-commit protocol with toll-bounded capability tokens; (ii) a universal seven-class action taxonomy mapping heterogeneous tool calls to comparable authority units; (iii) replay determinism and pathwise reserve coverage under alpha-spending; (iv) cross-domain normalization via full reserve demand C_full and capital metrics Capital@k. We instantiate AAI across four agentic environments (database mutation, customer-service refund, and the public tau-bench retail and airline tool-use traces) and report a live Postgres panel in which three Azure-hosted models propose actions through the same contract. The frontier exhibits a common low-reserve refusal and intermediate-release pattern across domains, with saturation only where the budget grid reaches full reserve demand; required reserve capital varies by 22x (Capital@50 from 289 to 6457). The framework does not force domains into the same shape; it surfaces each domain's actuarial geometry. In the live panel the contract prevents realized loss across all three models at low budget while differing in underwriting persistence under denial: model identity is an actuarial underwriting variable. The contribution is a benchmark-ready evaluation framework for runtime actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.

Paper A defines a time-consistent actuarial runtime that prices each side-effect-bearing action against a contractually fixed safe default and gates execution against a reserve budget. It treats the operator as passive. This paper makes the operator strategic. We characterise a five-attack space for autonomous AI-agent insurance contracts and prove when the actuarial runtime is gaming-resistant. Two attack surfaces -- post-toll safe-default selection and within-boundary action splitting -- are closed by Paper A's minimal-authority and no-splitting clauses. The remaining three require new contract clauses. First, common-control aggregation prevents cross-boundary re-routing from reducing toll below the boundary potential applied to total exposure. Second, interface failures such as invalid JSON are contract-relevant events, not safety wins: treating them as zero-toll safe defaults can reward unreliable models, while escalation fees reverse the incentive. We validate this interface-compliance theorem on committed cross-model traces from the companion empirical paper. Third, a model-identity menu with a componentwise-minimum penalty schedule makes truthful reporting of the deployed model weakly dominant. We then compose these clauses with Paper A's runtime guarantees to obtain joint incentive compatibility over the five-attack space. Finally, a two-parameter premium family discharges operator individual rationality and weak budget balance at the truthful equilibrium. The result is an incentive-compatibility layer for actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.

Agentic AI introduces new insurance challenges because autonomous AI systems can make decisions, invoke tools, modify external environments, and interact with third-party services. This paper develops an AI-native mathematical framework for underwriting, pricing, and contract design for agentic AI deployments. A deployment is represented by a risk state that captures autonomy level, operational authority, permission exposure, governance maturity, and dependency concentration. The framework maps the risk state to event probabilities, loss severities, governance costs, premiums, deductibles, coverage allocation, and policy covenants, and formulates an optimization problem for insurance contract design under participation, profitability, and incentive compatibility constraints. The paper establishes structural properties of insurability, including characterization of an insurability region, monotone deterioration of feasibility with increasing exposure, and governance certification thresholds. Insurance is further interpreted as both an operational cost and a regulatory mechanism for AI deployment. A healthcare case study illustrates contract optimization, sensitivity analysis, and automated claims processing for agentic AI systems.