Practical Anonymous Two-Party Gradient Boosting Decision Tree

Dealing simultaneously with confidentiality and Byzantine behaviors in decentralized learning is a challenging problem. Indeed, in decentralized learning, clients train a machine learning model while keeping their data locally and share their model parameters or gradients with a set of neighbors. While enforcing confidentiality calls for hiding the exchanged model parameters/gradients (e.g., by using cryptographic techniques), dealing with Byzantine contributions often requires inspecting the latter. Hence, most research works address these objectives separately. A recent line of work proposes to employ secure multi-party computation (MPC) to implement robust aggregators against model poisoning, thereby enforcing both confidentiality and Byzantine resilience. However, these solutions scale badly: they either require all-to-all communication between participants or delegate the entire computation to a small subset, whose computational and communication load grows proportionally with the size of the network. In this paper, we present Giskard, a protocol for confidential and Byzantine-robust decentralized aggregation. Giskard organizes $n$ parties into a tree of committees of size $O(\log n)$ and evaluates a coordinate-wise approximate median via a committee-adapted distributed binary search over the value domain, using BGW-style MPC within each committee. We assess Giskard both theoretically by proving its security and confidentiality properties and experimentally through extensive experiments involving up to one million participants. Compared to its closest competitors, Giskard reduces per-party communication complexity asymptotically while exhibiting comparable model utility under up to $n/4$ Byzantine parties.

Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training among multiple parties without centralizing raw data. There are two main paradigms in FL: Horizontal FL (HFL), where all participants share the same feature space but hold different samples, and Vertical FL (VFL), where parties possess complementary features for the same set of samples. A prerequisite for VFL training is privacy-preserving entity alignment (PPEA), which establishes a common index of samples across parties (alignment) without revealing which samples are shared between them. Conventional private set intersection (PSI) achieves alignment but leaks intersection membership, exposing sensitive relationships between datasets. The standard private set union (PSU) mitigates this risk by aligning on the union of identifiers rather than the intersection. However, existing approaches are often limited to two parties or lack support for typo-tolerant matching. In this paper, we introduce the Sherpa.ai multi-party PSU protocol for VFL, a PPEA method that hides intersection membership and enables both exact and noisy matching. The protocol generalizes two-party approaches to multiple parties with low communication overhead and offers two variants: an order-preserving version for exact alignment and an unordered version tolerant to typographical and formatting discrepancies. We prove correctness and privacy, analyze communication and computational (exponentiation) complexity, and formalize a universal index mapping from local records to a shared index space. This multi-party PSU offers a scalable, mathematically grounded protocol for PPEA in real-world VFL deployments, such as multi-institutional healthcare disease detection, collaborative risk modeling between banks and insurers, and cross-domain fraud detection between telecommunications and financial institutions, while preserving intersection privacy.

We present the first theoretical convergence analysis of machine learning training under fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), combined with a differentially private (DP) training algorithm tailored to encrypted computation. Our approach improves computational efficiency over standard differentially private gradient descent (DP-GD) while achieving comparable utility. In particular, we prove convergence of approximate gradient descent using polynomial approximations of activation and loss functions, which are required for FHE compatibility. To preserve privacy in downstream tasks, we integrate differential privacy without relying on costly per-sample gradient clipping, enabling scalable encrypted learning. We also provide data-independent hyperparameter selection and theoretically grounded strategies for polynomial approximation which can be of independent interest. Together, these contributions advance the feasibility of efficient, private, and secure machine learning on sensitive data.