Abstract
Card payment fraud detection is usually framed as a supervised classification problem. Although this approach has generated practical progress, improvement has remained incremental despite major advances in model architecture. We argue that this is not mainly a failure of function approximation or optimization, but a consequence of structural information impairments inherent to the payment ecosystem. We formalize card authorization as a sequential decision problem with delayed, censored, corrupted, and counterfactually missing feedback. We derive a minimax regret lower bound showing that these impairments enter multiplicatively in the denominator of the achievable learning rate. The bound implies that improving issuer reporting quality or reducing censorship can yield larger reductions in the regret floor than increasing model complexity. We also show that heterogeneity across issuers worsens learnability beyond what average impairment rates suggest. The paper contributes a theory of why fraud detection in payment networks is fundamentally harder than in standard online learning settings, identifies ecosystem information quality as the key bottleneck, and provides a theoretical basis for prioritizing investments in reporting infrastructure, dispute process quality, and selective exploration. The paper is theory-first and does not rely on proprietary transaction data.
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May 29, 2026cs.LG
Fraud detection in payment networks relies on labels generated through heterogeneous and imperfect observation processes, yet existing approaches treat fraud as a homogeneous binary variable. We show that this assumption is structurally incorrect and leads to provable inefficiency. We introduce an observation-mechanism taxonomy that partitions fraud into five classes, each defined by a distinct censorship and labeling pipeline. We prove that estimating fraud rates separately by class and aggregating strictly dominates pooled estimation, with the efficiency gap characterized as a Jensen penalty arising from heterogeneous observation rates. For each class, we derive the binding theoretical constraint on detection, including endogenous label corruption, structural non-observability, and feature non-informativeness. These results establish that fraud detection is fundamentally a collection of distinct estimation problems, each governed by its own observation structure and detection limit.
Gaurav Dhama
May 28, 2026cs.LG
Fraud detection models in payment networks train on chargeback labels that are systematically biased. Every label must survive three sequential gates: authorization (declined transactions generate no labels), issuer reporting (unreported fraud is invisible), and delay (pending chargebacks are missing at training time). Labels that do arrive may be corrupted by first-party misuse or issuer misclassification. A companion paper [arXiv:2605.27557] proved that these four impairments impose a minimax lower bound on detection performance. This paper asks: can that bound be achieved? We formalize the observation pipeline as a sequential missing-data problem with three propensity stages and a corruption layer, and construct the Sequential Triply Robust (STR) estimator. The STR corrects for all four impairments simultaneously and achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound -- no estimator can have lower asymptotic variance. It is sequentially triply robust: at each gate, consistency requires only that either the propensity model or the outcome regression is correctly specified, not both. We provide corruption correction via noise-rate-adjusted pseudo-labels, empirical Bayes shrinkage to stabilize inverse-propensity weights for small issuers, a plug-in variance estimator yielding valid confidence intervals, and a Bernstein concentration inequality for finite-sample guarantees. On the operational side, we derive the optimal training delay -- the maturity window that minimizes the sum of label-quality loss and model staleness -- and prove that the STR permits training on data that is days old rather than months old, decoupling model freshness from the chargeback maturity cycle. The STR provably dominates naive chargeback-based training in mean squared error for any sample size.
Gaurav Dhama
Jun 9, 2026cs.LG
Credit-card fraud detection is difficult because fraudulent transactions are rare, costly, and unevenly distributed. Strong gradient-boosted tree models already perform well on structured transaction data, so the value of another fusion method is not obvious. This paper examines whether Combinatorial Fusion Analysis (CFA), which searches over model subsets and rank-score fusion rules, can still add value on the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection benchmark. Using a leakage-free 60/20/20 train/validation/test protocol, we evaluate 480 fusion configurations built from seven base classifiers. The best test-set result comes from diversity-weighted score fusion of Random Forest, XGBoost, and LightGBM (DEF WtScore), with AUC-ROC = 0.9405, AUPRC = 0.6699, and F1 = 0.6373. Bootstrap confidence intervals from 1,000 resamples show that the gains over the strongest single model exclude zero for all three metrics. CFA matches soft voting on AUC-ROC, improves AUPRC and F1, and outperforms stacking in this setting. A CTGAN augmentation experiment gives a negative result: synthetic fraud samples degrade both individual models and CFA. Overall, CFA is most useful here not as a way to combine every classifier, but as a validation-stage method for choosing a small, complementary subset and assigning diversity-aware weights.
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