KBF: Knowledge Boundary as Fingerprint for Language Model and Black-Box API Auditing

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit systematic biases across demographic groups. Auditing is proposed as an accountability tool for black-box LLM applications, but suffers from resource-intensive query access. We conceptualise auditing as uncertainty estimation over a target fairness metric and introduce BAFA, the Bounded Active Fairness Auditor for query-efficient auditing of black-box LLMs. BAFA maintains a version space of surrogate models consistent with queried scores and computes uncertainty intervals for fairness metrics (e.g., $Δ$ AUC) via constrained empirical risk minimisation. Active query selection narrows these intervals to reduce estimation error. We evaluate BAFA on two standard fairness dataset case studies: \textsc{CivilComments} and \textsc{Bias-in-Bios}, comparing against stratified sampling, power sampling, and ablations. BAFA achieves target error thresholds with up to 40$\times$ fewer queries than stratified sampling (e.g., 144 vs 5,956 queries at $\varepsilon=0.02$ for \textsc{CivilComments}) for tight thresholds, demonstrates substantially better performance over time, and shows lower variance across runs. These results suggest that active sampling can reduce resources needed for independent fairness auditing with LLMs, supporting continuous model evaluations.

Black-box model attribution is increasingly relevant when large language models (LLMs) are served through relay and reseller APIs. A tempting low-cost signal is the prompt-token count returned by an OpenAI-compatible endpoint: two models that share a tokenizer and chat template may produce the same count sequence up to a fixed offset. Yet the validity of this signal for broader \emph{model-family} attribution has received little direct holdout testing. We conduct a frozen-threshold study over 24 labeled endpoint pairs, split evenly into a development set and an untouched holdout set, with three temporal repeats and 30 controlled texts per pair. We introduce a validity-gated result contract that distinguishes an observed dissimilarity from an uninformative measurement caused by missing usage data, rate limits, or endpoint policy. The resulting shift-invariant exact-match score perfectly separates the 12 development pairs, yielding a frozen threshold of 0.725. On holdout, however, only 6 of 12 pairs are eligible under the pre-specified three-repeat rule. Among eligible pairs, balanced accuracy is 0.75, sensitivity is 0.50 (95% Wilson interval 0.15--0.85), and specificity is 1.00 (0.342--1.00). Two same-family pairs---Qwen 3.8 and DeepSeek V4 variants---fall below the frozen threshold. Across 4,320 formal API calls, every log is replayable, while holdout contains 189 non-200 responses and 157 successful responses without prompt-token usage. The study therefore validates token-count consistency as a fingerprint of a shared \emph{tokenization stack}, but rejects its use as a standalone necessary test for model-family lineage.

The 2025--2026 AI market has seen a wave of stealth releases: frontier models launched anonymously on developer platforms under codenames. For their users, identity determines data-handling terms, supply-chain risk, and capability expectations. No validated methodology exists for black-box identity verification of anonymous models: practitioner checklists lack accuracy evidence, and self-identification is untrustworthy by design. We propose a four-stage forensic audit protocol for API-served models. Stage 0 reconstructs launch-time configuration from archived platform snapshots (Internet Archive), exposing preview--production drift. Stage 1 fingerprints configuration (context, output ceiling, reasoning, modality) against the platform catalog. Stage 2 tests tokenizer identity with a cross-length differential that rejects short-prompt collisions. Stage 3 corroborates with behavioral probes. We test declaration consistency on 10 known-identity releases (7 exact, 2 precision-differences, 1 partial, 0 counter-directional), not end-to-end identification under anonymity. Identification is validated prospectively on a flagship case whose 2026-08-23 analysis pointed to the GLM-5.3 version line and whose official reveal confirmed those family and version-line inferences (deployment variant was not pre-asserted; Flash was consistent post-reveal), and on three Stage-0-only cases where the protocol produced a graded hypothesis or declined rather than guessed. A standard-library-only implementation is provided as supplementary material.