Hidden Thoughts Are Not Secret: Reasoning Trace Exposure in LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in complex reasoning tasks via long chain-of-thought (CoT), yet their immense computational overhead hinders real-world deployment. LLM reasoning distillation addresses this by transferring reasoning capabilities from formidable teacher models to compact student models. However, existing distillation paradigms face a fundamental dilemma. Typical off-policy distillation strictly utilizes teacher-generated golden trajectories, suffering from an exposure bias due to the mismatch between training distributions and student-generated inference contexts, which leads to error cascades in long CoT reasoning. To address this, on-policy distillation allows students to explore their own trajectories, but we demonstrate that it inherently introduces a reciprocal reversed exposure bias: the teacher model also struggles to provide positive guidance when conditioned on student-generated sub-optimal contexts. To resolve this dual exposure biases problem, we propose Monitoring Trajectories and Backtracking when it strays (MOTAB), a new LLM reasoning distillation pipeline. Specifically, MOTAB dynamically monitors the student's on-policy generation against an adaptive safety boundary. When the generation strays and exceeds this threshold, MOTAB backtracks to the last safe state and leverages teacher intervention to correct the course. This approach inherently tolerates minor student errors to mitigate exposure bias, while preventing sub-optimal contexts to circumvent reversed exposure bias. Extensive experiments on the LIMO-v2 and AceReason datasets demonstrate that MOTAB effectively alleviates the dual exposure biases, yielding a roughly 3% average performance improvement in reasoning tasks.

Leading large language model providers now conceal their models' step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Rather than storing these traces server-side, providers return them to the client as blocks of encrypted text, which the client passes back with each subsequent request. Building on prior research, we identify an architectural vulnerability: these encrypted blocks are fully compatible and interchangeable across different sessions, users, and models within a provider's ecosystem. We exploit this compatibility to develop a scalable decryption jailbreak. By injecting an encrypted reasoning trace from a given model into a weaker, and less safeguarded model from the same provider, we force it to decode and output the trace verbatim in plaintext, without ever jailbreaking the more capable model directly. This vulnerability enables four distinct attack vectors. First, it circumvents anti-distillation mechanisms, allowing adversaries to extract a proprietary model's reasoning, as we demonstrate across Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Second, it allows for large-scale private data extraction. Developers frequently share session logs publicly, unaware of contents of the encrypted blocks. By decoding 315,320 reasoning blocks scraped from public repositories, we recovered 367 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) artifacts and 182 credentials. Third, it inadvertently reveals hazardous information hidden within the reasoning process, even in cases where the model's final, visible output safely rejects a malicious request. Fourth, attackers can leverage this flaw to execute invisible prompt injections, embedding malicious payloads entirely within encrypted blocks to poison public agentic rollouts. Following responsible disclosure, we propose concrete cryptographic and system-level mitigations to secure client-side reasoning.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting often improves the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs), but the internal signal that triggers this behavior remains poorly understood. Leveraging the sparse features captured by Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), we propose a systematic framework to analyze and intervene on the internal representations of LLMs, identifying a small set of latent features that are linked to reasoning behavior and can be causally tested through targeted intervention. Across multiple model families and reasoning benchmarks, we show that steering one or a small number of reasoning-related latent features can substantially induce reasoning behavior without explicit CoT prompting, achieving accuracy comparable to CoT. We further show that the identified features are not tied to particular wording patterns or verbosity, and confirm their causal role in reasoning through suppression experiments that impair performance even under CoT prompting. These results suggest that CoT prompting activates specific latent features to trigger reasoning, and that targeted intervention on these features offers an alternative pathway to elicit efficient reasoning behavior without explicit CoT prompting. Code is available at https://github.com/Zhenghao-He/LatentCoT.