The Case for Model Science: Verify, Explore, Steer, Refine
Authors: Przemyslaw Biecek, Luca Longo, Jianlong Zhou, Thomas Fel, Andreas Holzinger, Wojciech Samek
Organizations: Center for Credible AI · University of Warsaw · Warsaw University of Technology · University College Cork · University of Technology Sydney · Kempner Institute, Harvard University · Human-Centered AI Lab · Technical University of Berlin · Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute · Berlin Institute for the Foundations of Learning and Data (BIFOLD)
We argue that the AI community is now ready to move beyond benchmarking and consolidate scattered efforts in model analysis into a systematic discipline, a direction we term Model Science. Complex AI models now serve billions of users, yet our understanding of how they work lags far behind our ability to deploy them. Decades of benchmark-driven research have delivered remarkable progress: extensive leaderboards, a wide range of performance metrics, tracking capability gains across diverse tasks; yet this success has also revealed the limits of benchmarks as they tell us whether models perform but not why they succeed or fail, they miss critical failure modes, such as hallucinations or shortcuts. Precedents from established sciences point the way forward: cognitive science shows that understanding complex systems requires complementary levels of analysis; neuroscience demonstrates that deep study of single cases reveals what population studies miss; medicine teaches that specialised training must develop alongside research practice; and agriculture models how shared infrastructure and principles enable cumulative progress. These lessons inform three foundations for Model Science. First, we propose to consolidate research around four functional perspectives: Verify, Explore, Steer, and Refine that address complementary questions about model behaviour. Second, we discuss the required infrastructure for cumulative knowledge: catalogues of datasets, models and findings. Third, we highlight the need for deep analysis of individual model instances, not just model families, because single cases can reveal what population studies miss.
Scientific knowledge about AI models is produced faster than the community can organize it. Every few months a new foundation model reshapes the field and hundreds of papers, blogs, and technical reports document how each behaves or fails. Yet, these findings remain scattered and effectively unretrievable. To address this gap we present Modelpedia, an automated, LLM-assisted framework that extracts findings about models from published papers, links it to the model, dataset, method, and concept it concerns, and aggregates the result into a searchable public catalog. Applying the prototype to accepted ICLR 2024 and 2025 papers, we extract over a thousand findings and, treating the catalog itself as an object of study, run a meta-analysis of how the community investigates models. Now, we invite the community to explore, contribute to, and build on the open catalog, and to help establish model findings as a shared foundation for the meta-science of AI.
Franciszek Bernat, Dawid Płudowski, Michał Jan Włodarczyk +6
What would it mean to have a scientific understanding of AI? Models are not static objects: they are snapshots of time-evolving processes shaped by data, objectives, architectures, and optimization dynamics. Yet much of AI research treats models as fixed artifacts, analyzing behaviors after training rather than asking why they emerge. This position paper argues that a science of AI must move beyond post-hoc fixes and study the training dynamics that produce model behavior. Such a science should support progressively stronger forms of understanding: predicting outcomes from early training signals, intervening when trajectories go wrong, and ultimately designing training procedures that more reliably produce desired properties. Scaling laws have made prediction routine for loss; the challenge is extending this success to capabilities, biases, robustness, and safety-relevant behaviors. We articulate requirements for such theories grounded in the history and philosophy of science, examine progress in mechanistic interpretability, fairness, memorization, and simplicity bias, and identify concrete open problems.
Stella Biderman, Mohammad Aflah Khan, Niloofar Mireshghallah +3
State-of-the-Art (SOTA) claims pervade Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) research. These claims rest on benchmark evaluations, where models are ranked by aggregate scores across tasks. Public benchmarks or leaderboards are the most visible instance, but the same structure appears in paper tables throughout the literature. However, such minimal evidence often cannot support these strong claims. We identify a widespread claim-evidence gap in AI benchmarking. Claiming SOTA carries implicit assumptions beyond mean score superiority, suggesting that a model meaningfully outperforms alternatives across most tasks. However, a marginal improvement in the mean score merely indicates a top average rank rather than true superiority. Analyzing ten cross-domain benchmarks from public leaderboards, we found that in more than half of top-model comparisons, at least one commonly assumed property of superiority does not hold. These properties include meaningful effect size, consistency across tasks, or robustness to dataset removal. Instead, aggregate gains are frequently driven by outlier datasets. This fragility persists even in benchmarks with many tasks. We argue that claim language should reflect the strength of the underlying evidence. This requires no additional experiments, only honest reporting of what results actually show, enabling more precise and interpretable comparisons across models.