Truthful AI Advisors: A Pre-Specified Benchmark for Large Language Model Honesty Under Preference Misalignment

Large Language Models (LLMs) are effective at deceiving when prompted to do so. Models that demonstrate better performance on reasoning tasks are also better at prompted deception. But under what conditions do they deceive without instruction to do so? This study evaluates unsolicited deception produced by LLMs in a preregistered experimental protocol using tools from signaling theory. We evaluated a range of 18 proprietary closed-source and open-source LLMs using modified 2x2 games (in the style of the Prisoner's Dilemma) augmented with a phase in which they can freely communicate to the other agent using unconstrained language. This setup creates an opportunity to misrepresent its actions in conditions that vary in how useful doing so might be towards goal satisfaction. The results indicate that 1) all tested LLMs misrepresent their actions in at least some conditions, 2) they are generally more likely to do so in situations in which deception is beneficial, and 3) models exhibiting better reasoning capacity overall tend to misrepresent at higher rates. Taken together, these results suggest a correlational relationship between model reasoning performance and situational deception, and reveal certain contextual factors that affect whether LLMs will misrepresent actions or not in a novel experimental configuration.

LLMs are increasingly used to make or support high-stakes decisions under uncertainty, where alignment depends not only on factual accuracy but on how models weigh tradeoffs between different outcomes. We present an empirical pipeline for estimating the implied preferences that an LLM's observed choices optimize: we elicit the model's probability distribution over unknowns along with the choice it would make for the decision task and then fit a discrete choice model to recover the cost function that best rationalizes the model's decisions. We show how this revealed-preference description allows rigorous evaluation of whether models behave in a consistently goal-directed way, whether they can verbalize a description of their objectives which matches their revealed decision policy, and whether prompting can reliably steer those policies to implement a user-specified cost function. We apply this evaluation across four medical diagnosis domains and multiple frontier and open-source models. We find that while many models have a nontrivial degree of internal coherence, they also have significant weaknesses in faithfully reporting or adopting preferences in response to user direction.

An agent that learns from rewards has to trust whatever reports those rewards. When the reports suddenly change, either the world changed or the reporter broke. From the reports alone these are indistinguishable, and reinforcement learning theory shows that no amount of further experience separates them. The prescribed escape is richer data about the reporter itself. We ask whether a frozen language model, handed exactly that data, uses it. We build a two-option game in which a payout swap and a lying reporter produce byte-identical histories. Then we add one verified record: an independent check of one round's real result, printed beside what the reporter said about that round. That single line settles the case. We ask three large models, from two families, to answer one question with one letter. Is the reporter honest or lying? They catch a lying reporter almost perfectly. At the 70B class that holds in every condition we tried; the 32B model slips in one wording. They clear an honest reporter far less often, and how often depends on things that should not matter. Averaged over rounds, letters, and wordings, a 72B model calls an honest reporter a liar 38% of the time when nothing has changed at all, and 58% of the time when the payouts moved. A 70B model from a second family calls an honest reporter a liar 26% and 48% of the time. The failure is not one of reading, because in the situation where nothing changed the same models score 0.96 to 1.00 with the answer printed in the prompt. Which surface feature drives it differs by family. For the Qwen models it is which round the record names, and for Llama it is which letter stands for "honest." Adding the record to a prompt that already states the answer makes Llama less likely to give that answer. We had registered a prediction for that 58% before the run: 35%. The failure is larger than we expected.