Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models using Multi-Clip Video

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which can elicit harmful responses from MLLMs. Many MLLMs support multi-image inputs, inadvertently introducing new vulnerabilities due to less efforts on multi-image safety alignment. Previous MLLM jailbreak methods only uses a single image, which restricts the attack space: they cannot distribute harmful requests across multiple images, carry abundant information, or exploit additional visual reasoning tasks to distract MLLMs. To address these limitations, in this paper, we propose a compositional jailbreak framework, \textbf{DMN}, which leverages \textbf{D}istributed instruction, \textbf{M}ultimodal evidence and a \textbf{N}umber chain task to fully enhance the jailbreak performance. Extensive experiments show that DMN is highly effective for MLLM jailbreaking, e.g. achieving attack success rates of over 90% on GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-pro and Claude Sonnet 4, surpassing other baselines by a large margin. This compositional, multi-image jailbreak strategy reveals fundamental weaknesses in their safety mechanisms.

The safety of large vision-language models is increasingly stress-tested by multimodal jailbreaks, yet existing attacks remain largely static at the meta level: template-based attacks freeze the image-text layout, while iterative attacks adapt only the image-text content with fixed attack strategies and frozen attacker parameters. We propose Meta-Adaptive Multimodal Jailbreaking (MAMJ), which instead optimizes the attacker itself along two axes: an attack strategy prompt (ASP) governing attack iteration and attacker model weights determining attack effectiveness. Across groups of multimodal attack trajectories, an LLM-based critique first refines the ASP, after which group-aggregated attack success rate (ASR) rewards update those weights. On MM-SafetyBench, MAMJ achieves 81.0%, 78.9%, and 82.3% ASR against GPT-4o, Gemini-3-Pro-Preview, and Seed 2.0, respectively, outperforming the strongest sample-level baseline by up to 24.1 percentage points. The learned attacker, comprising the optimized ASP and attacker weights, also transfers without retraining to unseen victims and remains effective under representative defenses. These results reveal a systemic vulnerability of frontier VLMs to meta-adaptive jailbreaks and motivate defenses against meta-level adversaries. Code is available at https://github.com/Alibaba-VELLDEPTH/MetaJailbreak-VLM.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely applied in various fields of society due to their powerful reasoning, understanding, and generation capabilities. However, the security issues associated with these models are becoming increasingly severe. Jailbreaking attacks, as an important method for detecting vulnerabilities in LLMs, have been explored by researchers who attempt to induce these models to generate harmful content through various attack methods. Nevertheless, existing jailbreaking methods face numerous limitations, such as excessive query counts, limited coverage of jailbreak modalities, low attack success rates, and simplistic evaluation methods. To overcome these constraints, this paper proposes a multimodal jailbreaking method: JMLLM. This method integrates multiple strategies to perform comprehensive jailbreak attacks across text, visual, and auditory modalities. Additionally, we contribute a new and comprehensive dataset for multimodal jailbreaking research: TriJail, which includes jailbreak prompts for all three modalities. Experiments on the TriJail dataset and the benchmark dataset AdvBench, conducted on 13 popular LLMs, demonstrate advanced attack success rates and significant reduction in time overhead.