Scientific simulators are increasingly being integrated into LLM-driven systems for high-stakes simulation-driven decision-making. However, existing frameworks primarily use LLMs to generate, calibrate, or execute simulators, treating them as black-box interfaces rather than as structured mechanistic systems that can be reasoned about. As a result, current approaches lack the ability to identify, represent, and reason about the assumptions and mechanisms underlying simulator behavior, limiting transparency, auditability, and decision justification. We introduce MechSim, a mechanism-grounded neuro-symbolic reasoning framework for executable scientific simulators. Unlike prior neuro-symbolic approaches that primarily reason over static symbolic structures, MechSim enables LLM agents to reason about the mechanisms, assumptions, and execution behavior of scientific simulators. Our framework represents simulators through a shared structured schema capturing assumptions, variables, mechanism dependencies, and execution traces. On top of this representation, LLM agents operate as constrained reasoning engines that generate structured, evidence-grounded explanations linking simulator outcomes to their underlying mechanisms. We evaluate our approach across multiple high-stakes domains and show that it improves mechanism-level explanation quality, simulator analysis, and downstream decision-making reliability.
Simulatability is an evaluation protocol for explanations that quantifies their usefulness by how well they help a user predict a task model's outputs. Since human evaluation is costly, automated simulatability replaces human explainees with LLM simulators, as proposed in ConSim (Poch'e et al., 2025) for large-scale experiments. We qualitatively replicate and extend ConSim's ranking of explanation methods across the tested datasets, explanation families, and simulator LLMs, and identify two limitations. First, when class names are meaningful, simulators can obtain high simulatability by solving the classification task directly, without relying on the explanations. Second, class anonymization can reward explanations for leaking the hidden label mapping, a limitation we expose with a new classes-as-concepts baseline. These results are consistent with a shortcut hypothesis: in the tested settings, simulator predictions mainly rely on task priors, while explanations produce small changes. We derive recommendations for more robust automated simulatability evaluations.
Three paradigmatic forms of inference recur across scientific reasoning: deduction, induction, and causal abduction. Reliably evaluating LLMs on these in scientific settings is currently out of reach: scientific benchmarks built on human annotations are costly and lack mechanistic ground truth, while synthetic logical-reasoning benchmarks do not resemble real scientific documents. We introduce SciR, a benchmark that combines multi-paradigm reasoning with controllable scientific rendering, anchored on three paradigmatic scientific problems. Tasks are generated from formal objects (deduction tree, inductive rule hypothesis, causal graph) to guarantee verifiable answers, then rendered into multi-document scientific discourse via per-track domain-tuned genres. The construction lets us independently vary two difficulty axes: how hard it is to extract the key information needed for inference, and how hard the principled inference itself is. We test six models. Both axes hurt every model, and their effects compound. The rendering even hurts neurosymbolic pipelines, which hand inference to a verified solver. The two axes yield a per-model extraction-vs-inference profile: for instance, reasoning models like deepseek-r1 mostly surpass non-reasoning instruct models on the inference axis. To our knowledge, SciR is the first multi-paradigm scientific-reasoning benchmark with parametric control on both extraction and inference difficulty.
Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.