Caliper: Probing Lexical Anchors versus Causal Structure in LLMs

Instruction-tuned language models can answer the same causal-reasoning question differently after its English variable names are replaced by type-preserving placeholders, although the structural causal model and the gold answer are unchanged. We ask whether this lexical gap reflects information loss in the placeholder view or a misaligned read-out from a representation that still carries answer-relevant content. Vernier uses a paired-view weight update as an instrument and then inspects the mechanism left after the gap closes. In the working regimes, the evidence favours representational misalignment. A variable-name probe becomes more accurate on the placeholder view, and activation patching on Qwen-7B, Qwen-14B, and Llama-3.1-8B shows that the decision-token representation can transfer answer identity between views. The update that realigns the views is counterfactual augmentation over original and placeholder prompts, while the answer-subspace KL mainly sharpens intermediate answer-belief agreement. Success is bounded by model family, scale, and task. CRASS transfer is reliable across Qwen scales and Llama, e-CARE remains weak, and preliminary non-causal rename tasks show a similar qualitative pattern.

Because large language models (LLMs) are impressively successful in predicting text, it appears that they must have access to a 'world model' representing causal and definitional structure. However, the dominant formalisms of modern causal inference -- Judea Pearl's interventionist approach and the Neyman-Rubin potential outcomes framework -- struggle to illuminate how LLMs learn causal structure. I resolve this puzzle by arguing that LLMs employ a specific inductive approach based on a difference-making logic -- sometimes called variational induction. I demonstrate how central aspects of this logic are realized during training, where LLMs require enormous amounts of text data from a wide range of contexts to identify difference- and indifference-makers within word sequences. Furthermore, I analyze specific architectural features of LLMs -- such as token embeddings and self-attention -- to determine their roles in variational induction. The difference-making logic of LLMs fundamentally parallels the experimental method, where causal relations are derived by systematically varying individual circumstances to determine their influence on a phenomenon.

We find a mismatch between what large language models encode about a causal question and what they answer. On anti-commonsense CLadder items, a fixed linear probe recovers the evidence-supported answer from the model's hidden state (accuracy approximately 0.97), while the spoken Yes/No reverts to the commonsense one (accuracy approximately 0.5). We call this approximately +0.5 gap Causal Tongue-Tie: a wrong Yes/No decomposes into two separable failure modes: no internal signal versus a signal the verbal interface cannot say. The implication cuts both ways for output-only causal benchmarks: a benchmark "correct" need not mean the model has understood, and a benchmark "wrong" need not mean it cannot. Sweeping claims about whether LLMs can do causal reasoning, drawn from a single accuracy number, deserve a second look.