Authors: Adam N. Elmachtoub, Hyemi Kim, Jonathan Y. Tan
Organizations: Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research and Data Science Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027 · Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027
Data-driven pricing is increasingly prevalent in sectors such as airlines, lending, insurance, and retail. By learning demand models from customer features and setting prices accordingly, these systems may generate discriminatory outcomes that raise fairness concerns. This leads to fundamental questions - how and where should systems incorporate fairness considerations in the pricing pipeline, and how does it ultimately affect societal outcomes? To answer these, we study a stylized model where a seller has a two-stage decision pipeline comprising linear demand model estimation followed by price optimization. The seller considers fairness notions in training loss, price, and demand, under both parity-wise and Rawlsian perspectives. We show that equalizing training loss across consumer groups leads to multiple solutions, which in turn can result in undesirable outcomes despite being a standard approach in fair machine learning. Focusing instead on fairness applied directly to prices or demand, we compare two strategies that enforce fairness in either the demand estimation stage or the price optimization stage. For parity-wise fairness, we characterize when each strategy yields higher social welfare under small fairness levels. We show that when market sizes and prices in the dataset are similar, imposing price fairness in the estimation stage is more beneficial to consumers, whereas imposing demand fairness in the optimization stage yields better consumer outcomes. For Rawlsian fairness, the two strategies coincide exactly. Lastly, we extend our model to alternate demand functions and conduct a case study using real-world vaccine pricing data.
Pricing food products to balance profitability with consumer welfare is a central challenge for retailers. Dynamic pricing is widely used to maximize revenue, yet most pricing models optimize business objectives while overlooking consumer fairness. This paper studies the risk of consumer exploitation under dynamic food pricing in Canada and proposes a methodology that embeds fairness constraints directly into retail sales forecasting. We model total retail trade sales with a log--log Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) specification, in which the coefficient on a product price is a sales elasticity, and pose the pricing problem as maximizing forecast sales subject to price bounds anchored to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). We solve this problem with both Linear Programming (LP) and Simulated Annealing (SA), under single-product and multi-product configurations. A key finding is that the fitted nominal elasticities are positive. As a result, an unconstrained sales-maximizer would push every price to its upper bound, and the CPI ceiling is the safeguard that prevents this. Simulated Annealing instead settles on conservative, interior prices that lower consumer cost while still meeting the sales target. We benchmark forecast accuracy against naive, seasonal-naive, ARIMA, and SARIMA baselines, and a CPI-deflated re-specification shows that the positive nominal elasticities are largely an inflation-driven artifact. The result is a transparent, fairness-aware pricing framework.
We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only transacted quantities and prices can be observed, this presents a general demand learning problem under confounding. Mathematically, we develop an algorithm with optimal regret of \TildeO(T∧σS−2). Our results reveal that supply-side noise fundamentally affects the learnability of demand, leading to a phase transition in regret. Technically, we show that non-i.i.d. actions can serve as instrumental variables for learning demand. We also propose a novel homeomorphic construction that allows us to establish estimation bounds without assuming star-shapedness, providing the first efficiency guarantee for learning demand with deep neural networks. Finally, we use simulations and offline counterfactuals from Talabat and Lyft data to illustrate the potential revenue implications of our approach.
In this paper, we establish a set of theoretical impossibility results, termed the No-Free-Fairness theorems, that identify three fundamental sources of disparity in learning systems. First, we show that when a task exhibits irreducible cost on a subgroup, any decision rule must trade off overall performance with disparity, yielding an inherent fairness--cost frontier. Second, we prove that even in ideal, noise-free settings where a perfectly fair and accurate solution exists, finite-sample learning alone induces nontrivial subgroup disparity, ruling out distribution-free fairness guarantees. More seriously, enforcing strict relative fairness creates a statistical bottleneck: achieving low cost may require exponentially many samples. Third, we show that limitations of the model class can independently induce disparity: if the model cannot represent accurate solutions for a subgroup, fairness remains unattainable regardless of data or training procedure. Overall, these results demonstrate that unfairness is not solely a consequence of biased data or suboptimal optimization, but arises from the intrinsic structure of decision problems, the constraints of finite data, and the expressivity of models. Our framework applies broadly beyond standard supervised learning, and suggests that achieving fairness requires explicit trade-offs and should be treated as a core design consideration.