AI Sovereignty: A Qualitative Model of Strategic Competition as AI Becomes an Instrument of National Power

A small number of firms based in two states produce the most capable frontier AI models. The governments of those states have shown both the legal power and the political will to decide which other countries may use these systems. In June 2026 the United States required a leading developer to obtain licences before releasing its most advanced models to any foreign person, including foreign nationals resident in the United States. The affected models were withdrawn worldwide at short notice, partly because the restriction proved impractical to administer. This followed within months of the first documented case of a largely autonomous, AI-run cyber espionage campaign, and coincided with mounting evidence that frontier models alter the economics of both cyber attack and cyber defence. This article examines how these two developments interact, and situates them within the unusual market dynamics now driving large-scale AI development. It argues that access to frontier AI is becoming part of national cyber defence, that such access can be revoked, and that the obvious remedy of sovereign capability remains only partly feasible for all but a handful of states. Drawing on evidence about training costs, the concentration of computing power and the support offered by national AI programmes, it asks what sovereignty can realistically mean for small and middle powers, and for large powers as well. The article proposes a layered strategy: negotiated access guarantees, sovereignty at the level of inference, hedging with open-weight models, pooled regional capability, sustained talent development and continued investment in basic cyber resilience. The open-weight hedge proves at once more capable and more politically exposed than is commonly assumed. Much of the near-term risk lies in how capable models are deployed and contained rather than in their apparent performance.

Artificial intelligence in France is often discussed through separate dimensions such as investment, compute, regulation, employment, sovereignty, and education. This viewpoint paper proposes a unified interpretation: France can be analyzed as a national AI learning system. Building on Human-Centered Learning Mechanics (HCLM), we use HCLM not as a validated econometric model, but as a conceptual and diagnostic lens for interpreting national AI development as a balance between information injection, absorptive capacity, and institutional dissipation. Information injection includes compute, data, talent, research, capital, industrial deployment, and policy experimentation. Institutional dissipation refers to avoidable frictions such as administrative overload, coordination failures, energy constraints, regulatory uncertainty, talent mobility pressures, and weak industrial absorption. Regulation is not treated as mere friction: adaptive governance, trusted data spaces, and safety-oriented standards may increase long-term learning capacity by improving legitimacy, interoperability, and social trust. The central claim is not that a country follows neural-network equations, but that AI sovereignty depends on how effectively it converts distributed information into absorbed, coordinated, and socially legitimate capability. The paper connects HCLM with neural scaling laws, endogenous growth theory, creative destruction, absorptive capacity, and coordination mechanisms. It offers a formal heuristic, policy indicators, illustrative scenarios, and implications for France. The numerical results are diagnostic scenarios, not econometric estimates or official rankings. The proposed viewpoint reframes AI policy as the governance of an open, strategic, non-equilibrium learning system that should be tested with historical and cross-country data.

Frontier artificial intelligence is reshaping all aspects of society, from economic output or military capability to democratic institutions. The EU is entering this transformation from a position of structural dependence: frontier models originate almost exclusively from the United States or China, the US holds approximately sixteen times the EU's AI supercomputing capacity, and only 15% of global hyperscale data centre capacity resides within EU borders. Although the European Commission has accelerated its policy response, existing initiatives remain fragmented and lack a cohesive vision for securing strategic autonomy across the full frontier AI value chain. Here we propose a unified framework connecting five sovereignty pillars (economic competitiveness, resilience, security and defence, European values, and foreign relations) to a decomposition of the frontier AI stack comprising five layers, 26 components, and 29 sub-components. This framework allows the identification of critical gaps, redundancies, and inter-pillar trade-offs that current EU policy leaves implicit. Our analysis of the AI Gigafactory Initiative illustrates how a sovereignty-centred lens reveals conflicts that narrowly economic framings obscure. Moreover, this framework offers policymakers a structured basis for designing, evaluating, and prioritising frontier AI interventions across multiple dimensions of European strategic autonomy across the 92 initiatives from four major Commission communications we. identify, and beyond.