Large language models (LLMs) are becoming widely deployed as personal AI assistants with access to sensitive user data, making privacy a major challenge for their design and evaluation. Prior work focuses mainly on individual-level risks, overlooking \textbf{interdependent privacy (IDP)}--where one person's data may be revealed by others without their knowledge or consent. We address this gap by introducing \textbf{IDP-Bench}: the first LLM benchmark for IDP scenarios, grounded in the Contextual Integrity (CI) framework. We evaluate eight open-source LLMs on their understanding of IDP scenarios across three levels of IDP reasoning using two LLM judges. Results show strong co-ownership recognition (6/8 models exceed 90%) but persistent weaknesses in identifying CI parameters (information attribute, primary subject) and IDP-specific parameters such as secondary subjects, where 7/8 models score below 74%. Models also struggle to judge sharing appropriateness (5/8 scoring below 77%). While the ability to judge the appropriateness of sharing improves with scale, performance tends to decline in smaller models, and prompt sensitivity remains high on IDP-specific questions--highlighting the need for more targeted study of IDP in LLM privacy research. Data & code available \href{https://github.com/tisl-lab/Interdependent_Privacy_Bench}{here}.
LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-party environments, handling sensitive personal data on behalf of individual users, for instance in group chats. When such an agent discloses private information, it reaches every group member at once. This risk is structurally harder to control than in one-to-one settings, as every piece of private information must be appropriate for every recipient in the group. Yet all existing contextual privacy benchmarks consider only single-interlocutor settings, leaving multi-party privacy risks unmeasured. We introduce MuPPET (Multi-Party Privacy Exposure Testing), a benchmark for contextual privacy in multi-party conversations. Our experiments show that models leak substantially more in multi-party settings than one-to-one evaluations suggest. Frontier models are vulnerable, and smaller open-weights models, often preferred for local deployment with sensitive data, even more so. Existing contextual privacy defences offer only partial protection, degrade utility, and do not resolve the underlying party-tracking problem.
Elena Sofia Ruzzetti, Cornelius Emde, Sangdoo Yun +2
Recent work on protecting privacy during user-LLM interactions often focuses on direct, explicit identifiers: the personally-identifiable information (PII) captured by standard detectors. One such approach is Privacy-Conscious Delegation (PCD), where a local LLM acts as an intermediary. However, privacy risk does not stem solely from explicit identifiers but also PII-free self-disclosures, leaving users identifiable through combinations of quasi-identifying traits. We investigate a probabilistic variant of PCD, where we augment its objectives with an LLM-driven probabilistic estimation of k-anonymity. To facilitate this, we first create the PUPA-SD dataset, which contains naturalistic user queries with self-disclosure. Our preliminary results indicate that optimizing PAPILLON on PUPA-SD improves quality on unseen conversations across a variety of local models and produces the best privacy-utility balance for Llama-3.2-3B, while smaller models struggle to jointly optimize quality and privacy. We propose k-anonymity as a useful auxiliary metric for tackling PCD.
As LLM agents evolve from single-user assistants into shared organizational infrastructure, new privacy risks emerge: inappropriate information may not only be exposed through outputs for external recipients, but also internally across users through inter-agent messages, shared memory and agents. These data spillage risks are not captured by existing privacy benchmarks grounded in contextual integrity (CI) as they focus primarily on either single-user settings or interactions between independently owned agents. We introducePiSAs (Privacy in Shared Agentic systems), a benchmark for assessing unintentional leaks with dual CI annotations: whether an information is appropriate for the task, and which users may legitimately access it. This enables direct measurement of cross-user spillage across agentic system components and interfaces, such as outputs, inter-agent communication, and memory. PiSAsis system-agnostic and supports evaluation across different agent topologies and memory regimes. We find that, although system design improves CI compliance, results are bottlenecked by incorrect LLM judgment calls: even state-of-the-art models fail to reliably filter inappropriate content or restrict transmission to authorized users. Our findings underscore the need for privacy-preserving strategies, beyond those studied in this work.