Toward Trustworthy AI: Multi-Target Adversarial Attacks and Robust Defenses for Continuous Data Summarization

Training-time data poisoning during fine-tuning poses a significant threat to large language models (LLMs) deployed for abstractive text summarization, where small task-specific datasets exert disproportionate influence on model behavior. In this setting, adversaries manipulate fine-tuning data to induce persistent summarization failures, such as biased or harmful summaries, while preserving standard evaluation metrics. We present a unified post-hoc defense framework for detecting and remediating fine-tuning-stage poisoning in summarization models across the machine learning supply chain. Our experiments show that in white-box settings, poisoned document-summary pairs exhibit abnormally high training influence, enabling detection via influence-function analysis with semantic consistency checks. In black-box settings, poisoned models display two to three times greater sensitivity to semantics-preserving perturbations, enabling behavioral auditing without training data access. Beyond existing poisoning formulations, we introduce novel attacks targeting factual distortion and representational bias, showing that poisoning alters summarization behavior without triggering conventional alarms. Across nine architectures and six benchmark datasets under adaptive attacks, our defenses achieve 85-92% detection precision, while gradient-ascent unlearning restores up to 96% of original behavior with minimal utility loss (less than 0.6% ROUGE degradation). These results indicate that fine-tuning-time poisoning leaves persistent structural artifacts, enabling practical detection and post-deployment recovery without full retraining.

Adversarial robustness is commonly evaluated with predefined attack ensembles, such as AutoAttack, at a single perturbation budget $\varepsilon$ and on a selective choice of perturbation norms. We argue this formulation is fundamentally limited. First, robustness--perturbation curves may intersect or decay at different rates across models, making single-$\varepsilon$ rankings unstable. Second, current ensembles provide no evidence of optimality, leaving an unknown gap to worst-case performance. Third, fixed attack configurations provide no systematic control over the trade-off between attack strength and evaluation cost. To address these limitations, we introduce a unified evaluation framework based on a comprehensive pool of minimum-norm attacks and robustness--perturbation curves across $\ell_0$, $\ell_1$, $\ell_2$ and $\ell_\infty$ norms. We define the attack frontier as the worst-case robustness estimate the attack pool produces against a model. We then formalize evaluation as a frontier-approximation problem, constructing minimum-norm attack ensembles, optimized subsets of the comprehensive pool, that approach the frontier under a controllable query budget, with larger budgets monotonically tightening the estimate. Furthermore, we define the defense frontier as the maximum robustness across the model set at each perturbation size. We finally propose the Defense Optimality Index to rank defenses by their gap to the defense frontier, providing a ranking without selecting a reference $\varepsilon$. On CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, our ensembles match or exceed AutoAttack on most defenses at every budget tier, at fixed and controllable query cost, offering practitioners a query-controlled, curve-based alternative to fixed-$\varepsilon$ evaluation.

Dataset distillation (DD) compresses a large training set into a small synthetic set for efficient training, but most DD methods optimize only clean accuracy and leave robustness uncontrolled. Recent robust DD methods improve robustness, yet they often suffer from a poor accuracy-robustness trade-off because they (i) treat all adversarially perturbed examples uniformly, despite robust risk being dominated by near-zero robust margins, and (ii) do not explicitly increase inter-class separation in the decision boundary where attacks concentrate. We present Contrastive Curriculum for Robust Dataset Distillation (C$^2$R), a framework that couples an attack-aware curriculum with a contrastive robustness objective. From a robust-margin perspective, we derive a perturbation score that approximates each sample's robust hinge, enabling a curriculum that prioritizes the smallest-margin adversaries that most directly drive robust error. In parallel, a class-balanced contrastive robustness loss enforces adversarial invariance while explicitly widening boundary separation across classes. Experiments on CIFAR-10/100, Tiny-ImageNet, and multiple ImageNet-1K subsets under six attacks show that C$^2$R achieves the best robust accuracy, outperforming prior robust DD by $2.8$% on average.