Fault Lines: Navigating Ethics and Responsible AI Where National Policy Meets Local Practice in Public Sector Transformation

Public services face growing pressure to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) to close the gap between rising demand and falling resources. That pressure has intensified with general-purpose AI (GPAI): AI built on large language models that can be directed by prompt alone to perform an effectively unbounded range of tasks. We argue that the properties that make these models attractive - their generality, accessibility, and low deployment cost - undermine the conditions under which AI safety has historically been pursued. The safety concepts that public service governance frameworks foreground - accuracy, bias, explainability, and accountability - were made tractable by narrow, purpose-built AI, and the mitigations that guidance documents prescribe presuppose exactly what GPAI removes. Accuracy cannot be quantified over unbounded outputs. Bias cannot be disaggregated when outputs are free-text judgements rather than categorical predictions. Explainability gives way to the appearance of explanation, and accountability erodes as outputs are optimized to persuade. We develop this through the case of policing, where the consequences of governance failure are most severe, and show why the same failure is likely to recur across other public services. The two mitigations that dominate policing AI strategy - expert evaluation and human-in-the-loop oversight - both rest on assumptions that GPAI violates. Safety assurance thus shifts from an intrinsic feature of building an AI tool to an optional add-on. We recommend a clear taxonomic distinction between narrow and general-purpose AI in governance documentation, a preference for technological parsimony, a pause on operational deployment of GPAI in policing until adequate evidence exists, and a coordinated national safety infrastructure with the authority to generate that evidence and determine when responsible deployment is achievable.

Temporary accommodation has become a major fiscal and administrative pressure for English local authorities, particularly in London, where demand and costs have risen sharply. This paper documents the creation and use of DOMUS, a cloud-based, AI-enabled decision-support system built from scratch at the University of East London and customised for the needs of London Borough of Newham to support statutory Temporary accommodation placement. DOMUS integrates household case records, policy-constrained affordability and suitability rules, and live private-rental listings within a single governance-aligned workflow. The system combines transparent, rule-based filtering with large language model-assisted search to standardise the application of bedroom need, affordability thresholds, geographic preferences, and accessibility requirements, while preserving officer discretion and audibility. Household and property attributes are encoded into policy-consistent representations prior to AI-assisted ranking and explanation. A pilot deployment in Newham's secure environment evaluated operational performance relative to manual workflows. Results indicate substantial reductions in search time, improved adherence to key placement constraints, and high staff satisfaction, while maintaining statutory compliance and role-based accountability. Beyond TA, the paper frames DOMUS as replicable digital public infrastructure: a modular, cloud-native Software-as-a-Service architecture that can be deployed across other UK boroughs and adapted to other public administration tasks characterised by scarcity, rule-bound eligibility, and high stakes. The findings demonstrate the feasibility of scalable, ethically governed AI deployment in local government and contribute to debates on AI-enabled public value creation in e-governance.

The intersection of artificial intelligence adoption, cybersecurity governance, and public sector institutional constraints has not been examined as a unified analytical problem in the existing literature. Studies address AI cybersecurity risks generically, public sector governance independently, and framework adequacy separately. Existing studies have not integrated these three streams to explain specifically how AI adoption causes cybersecurity governance failure in government organizations, nor test existing governance instruments against AI-specific public sector failure causes. This paper ad-dresses that gap. It proposes a seven-domain typology identifying ten specific AI-driven cyber governance failure causes grounded in public sector institutional analysis. It presents a three-pathway failure model showing how accountability failure, opera-tional resilience failure, and compliance failure interact and reinforce each other. It de-livers a structured coverage matrix testing five major governance frameworks (NIST CSF 2.0, ISO/IEC 27001, COBIT, NIST AI RMF, and ISO/IEC 42001) against the typology, finding that no instrument addresses Shadow AI, speed asymmetry, or gov-ernance vacuum at the operational specificity required for public sector application. The paper introduces speed asymmetry as a named structural construct with a specified mechanism. The framework provides the design specification for an AI-enabled cyber-security maturity model for government organizations.