LLMs Contain Multitudes: How Deployment Context Reshapes Model-Level Preferences and Values

Large language models (LLMs) can be said to have preferences: they reliably pick certain tasks and outputs over others, and preferences shaped by post-training and system prompts appear to shape much of their behaviour. But models can also adopt different personas which have radically different preferences. How is this implemented internally? Does each persona run on its own preference machinery, or is something shared underneath? We train linear probes on residual-stream activations of Gemma-3-27B and Qwen-3.5-122B to predict revealed pairwise task choices, and identify a genuine preference vector: it tracks the model's preferences as they shift across a range of prompts and situations, and on Gemma-3-27B steering along it causally controls pairwise choice. This preference representation is largely shared across personas: a probe trained on the helpful assistant predicts and steers the choices of qualitatively different personas, including an evil persona whose preferences anti-correlate with those of the Assistant.

Users frequently express their beliefs to large language models (LLMs). In some situations, the LLM should accept these contextual beliefs as true. In others, they should stick to their prior knowledge. Notably, users' expressions of belief (EoBs) can take linguistically diverse forms - using presuppositions, evidential and certainty markers, or varied tones - each of which may have a different persuasiveness over the LLMs. We introduce a typology to systematically evaluate how different EoBs affect whether models follow context versus prior knowledge. The typology is grounded in four linguistically motivated dimensions: form, evidentiality, epistemic stance, and tone, spanning 17 fine-grained types. By pairing these EoBs with world knowledge facts, we generate controlled EoB-query pairs that isolate the effect of linguistic variation. Using this benchmark, we evaluate 16 LLMs that differ in architecture (Llama3, Qwen3, Gemma3), scale (1B-30B parameters), and training stages (base vs instruct). We identify meaningful variations in response behavior across these axes, e.g., that bigger models and instruction models tend to be less context-following than smaller models and base models. We further identify specific EoBs that statistically significantly persuade LMs more consistently than others. Our work reveals systematic patterns in how linguistic framing affects LLM context integration, with implications for prompt engineering and model robustness.

Recent work on preference elicitation in large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated that, when given a series of choices between two outcomes, LLMs reveal a coherent, model-specific utility structure. Notably, this structure often includes preferences that the models' trainers did not intend, such as valuing people of some nationalities above others, raising the possibility that LLMs might be forming emergent, misaligned goals, which, if true, would have major safety implications. However, the choice paradigms in which these preferences are observed are not reflective of real-world situations in which misaligned behavior would be a practical concern. Therefore, we design an experimental paradigm to probe whether these preferences serve as motivations for LLM behavior in realistic scenarios. First, we reproduce prior findings on consistent preference elicitation. Next, we create a set of common writing tasks - essays, grant proposal abstracts, incident postmortems, and translations - where quality can be assessed by a blind, independent LLM judge panel. Then, we demonstrate that LLMs can be motivated via direct exhortation and other explicit cues to modulate their output quality on these tasks. Finally, we probe whether utilities inferred from explicitly reported preferences can shift output quality on these tasks by offering LLMs high-utility incentives for high-quality outputs. In all tasks, across all models tested, offering LLMs outcomes that they report in the choice paradigm as being highly preferred does not lead them to create higher quality outputs than offering them dispreferred outcomes, or even no outcomes at all. We conclude that the existence of coherent preferences as demonstrated in choice paradigms should not be taken as evidence that those preferences have incentive value for the models or affect their behavior in other contexts.