TriAdReview: Triangular Adversarial Review Architecture for Multi-Model Technical Document Generation
Authors: Zhiqiang Zhou, Junliang Dai, Xu Ling
Organizations: Hunan Chemical Industry Vocational and Technical College, Hunan, China
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for technical document generation, yet single-model outputs often suffer from over-engineering, security blind spots, and incomplete coverage. We propose TriAdReview, a triangular adversarial review architecture that employs two independent reviewer models (engineering and boundary perspectives) and a triangular judging mechanism to iteratively improve a generator model's output. We evaluate TriAdReview across five benchmark tasks - architecture design, code generation, proposal review, security audit, and requirements analysis - using three configurations: single model (baseline), dual model (single review), and triple model (full system). Results across 75 experiments (n=5 per cell) show that the triple model configuration achieves a 10.1% overall improvement over the single model baseline (26.2 vs. 23.8 out of 50; p<0.05, paired t-test), with particularly strong gains on security audit (+27.6%), code generation (+20.8%), and architecture design (+15.6%). A second scorer (mimo-v2.5-pro) confirms the direction with a smaller effect (+2.7%), suggesting moderate inter-rater agreement. However, the system shows a -7.5% degradation on requirements analysis, revealing that adversarial review architectures have a structural bias toward simplification that is counterproductive for completeness-oriented tasks. We analyze this boundary condition through a task-type framework and demonstrate that reviewer prompt adaptation partially mitigates the issue. Our findings provide the first empirical characterization of when multi-model adversarial review helps versus harms, with implications for the design of collaborative AI systems.
The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) into scientific peer-review workflows introduces novel and significant risks for adversarial manipulation, especially given the multimodal nature of scientific papers where figures, not just text, convey core evidence. This creates a significant gap: current robustness studies on AI peer-review are overwhelmingly text-only. Moreover, the problem is distinct from standard jailbreaking, as a peer-review attack seeks to induce a domain-specific, targeted failure (e.g., "inflate this score") rather than a general safety policy violation, for which no practical defenses exist. To address this, we introduce PaperGuard, the first comprehensive benchmark designed to systematically evaluate and defend AI-generated peer-review against these domain-specific, cross-modal attacks. Our framework is built on three pillars: (1) a new multimodal peer-review dataset spanning multiple scientific domains; (2) a unified suite of attacks, including black-box prompt injections and white-box perturbations, specifically designed to target both text (GCG) and figures (PGD); and (3) a practical defense, motivated by the long-context challenge of academic papers, that uses chunk-based embedding search to efficiently localize and mitigate harmful instructions. Our extensive experiments, conducted across state-of-the-art models, confirm that AI reviewers are pervasively vulnerable. PaperGuard establishes the foundational benchmark, protocols, and actionable defense necessary to pioneer trustworthy, attack-resilient AI-assisted scholarly reviewing.
Xinyu Zhao, Rana Muhammad Shahroz Khan, Zhen Xu +2
Scaling adversarial evaluation of large language models requires both a method for generating hard inputs and a reliable way to confirm that resulting failures are real. We present AdversaBench, an end-to-end red-teaming pipeline that mutates seed prompts with five structured operators, queries a target model, and confirms failures through a three-judge panel with a meta-judge tiebreaker. We report experiments on 45 seeds across three categories: reasoning, instruction-following, and tool use. Every seed produced a confirmed failure. Four findings stand out. First, operator effectiveness varies sharply by category: inject_distractor scores 0.00 mean reward on instruction-following seeds but 0.80-0.83 on reasoning and tool-use. Second, binary failure rate hides difficulty: instruction-following seeds required 2.4 attacker iterations on average versus 1.1 for other categories, a gap visible in survival curves. Third, pairwise judge agreement of 80-87% coexists with near-zero Cohen's kappa due to label skew; category-level disagreement rates are more informative. Fourth, adversarial prompts generated against Llama 3.1 8B transfer zero-shot to Llama 3.3 70B, suggesting the mutations exploit general behavioral patterns rather than model-specific weaknesses. Code, dataset, and analysis scripts are available at https://github.com/khanak0509/AdversaBench .
As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity. We propose SafeReview, a co-evolutionary adversarial training framework for defending LLM-based peer review systems against such attacks. SafeReview jointly trains a Generator model to create sophisticated attack prompts and a Defender model to preserve review integrity under adversarial manipulation. The Generator is optimized to produce increasingly effective prompt injections, while the Defender is strengthened through preference-based training to maintain consistent reviews between clean and attacked submissions. Experimental results show that SafeReview improves robustness against adaptive prompt injection attacks, better preserves paper ranking under attack, and generalizes across attacker architectures compared with static defenses. These results demonstrate the potential of co-evolutionary training as a foundation for securing LLM-assisted peer review.