Neuron Level Analysis of Large Language Model in Legal Domain Reasoning
Authors: Eri Onami, Youmi Ma, Shuhei Kurita, Naoaki Okazaki
Organizations: Institute of Science Tokyo · NII · AIST
Abstract
We presented a neuron-level analysis of legal-domain reasoning in LLMs, comparing it with other applied domain tasks across seven open-weight models. Using neuron attribution scores to rank and suppress influential neurons, we confirmed that suppressing the identified neurons collapses accuracy on the target task, whereas suppressing the same number of random neurons does not. We further found a small subset of neurons influential across all seven tasks; once these are removed, suppressing the remaining neurons degrades only the task they were identified from, revealing genuinely task-specific neurons in every model studied. Within the legal domain, the three benchmarks exhibit relatively high neuron overlap and tend to be affected jointly, suggesting of legal components neurons that span jurisdictions. The distribution of identified neurons in our experiments suggests that the hypothesis that influential neurons are concentrated in middle MLP layers may depend on the input format and content, rather than being a universal phenomenon.
Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced automated legal reasoning. Yet, it remains unclear whether their performance reflects genuine legal reasoning ability or artifacts of data contamination. We present a comprehensive empirical study of tax law reasoning approaches and implement a contamination detection protocol to rigorously assess LLM reliability. We show that performance can be inflated by contamination. Building on this analysis, we conduct a systematic evaluation, comparing monolithic LLMs with hybrid systems that translate statutory text into formal representations and delegate inference to symbolic solvers. We build a novel test suite designed to probe generalization to unseen documents via case and rule variations. Our findings indicate that legal reasoning is inherently compositional and that neuro-symbolic frameworks offer a more reliable and robust foundation for legal AI, as well as improved generalization to unobserved situations.
Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve strong performance on reasoning tasks, but whether this reflects faithful logical inference or heuristic approximation remains unclear. We study this question in legal entailment by comparing three paradigms, including pure LLM classification, LLM-based Formal Reasoning, and solver-based Formal Reasoning using the Z3 SMT solver, on a re-annotated subset of ContractNLI across five LLMs. Our re-annotation reveals a systematic and measurable gap between pragmatic legal interpretation and strict formal entailment, where a substantial proportion of legally sound inferences are not formally grounded without additional unstated assumptions. While introducing formal structure improves accuracy, with LLM-based Formal Reasoning achieving the highest benchmark performance, we show that this gain does not imply faithful reasoning. We identify three recurring failure modes: scope laundering, where LLMs report solver-inconsistent classifications without executing the underlying formal reasoning, producing conclusions that appear logically grounded but are not; implicit constraint blindness, where LLMs overlook logical constraints present in formal representations; and program synthesis failures, where LLMs generate incorrect Z3 code despite structured prompting. Critically, scope laundering persists across all models, raising serious concerns about the faithfulness of LLM-based formal reasoning as a proxy for symbolic execution. These results reveal a fundamental gap between benchmark accuracy and logical faithfulness.
As Large Language Models (LLMs) are proposed as legal decision assistants, and even first-instance decision-makers, across a range of judicial and administrative contexts, it becomes essential to explore how they answer legal questions, and in particular the factors that lead them to decide difficult questions in one way or another. A specific feature of legal decisions is the need to respond to arguments advanced by contending parties. A legal decision-maker must be able to engage with, and respond to, including through being potentially persuaded by, arguments advanced by the parties. Conversely, they should not be unduly persuadable, influenced by a particularly compelling advocate to decide cases based on the skills of the advocates, rather than the merits of the case. We explore how frontier open- and closed-weights LLMs respond to legal arguments, reporting original experimental results examining how the quality of the advocate making those arguments affects the likelihood that a model will agree with a particular legal point of view, and exploring the factors driving these results. Our results have implications for the feasibility of adopting LLMs across legal and administrative settings.