Understanding the meaning of negated sentences remains one of the challenges for language models, even in the era of large language models (LLMs). We analyze systematicity regarding LLM understanding of negation from two perspectives: behavioral systematicity and representational systematicity. For behavioral systematicity, we confirm that through demonstrations and in-context learning, LLMs can recognize negation expressions and scope within sentences to some extent, but they fail to achieve perfect performance. In particular, the difficulty of the negation scope recognition for models varies depending on the output format. For representational systematicity, we analyze the extent to which function vectors can be robustly constructed from in-context examples for tasks that are essential to understanding negation. The experiments suggest that while function vectors can be composed for negation cue extraction tasks, extracting function vectors for recognizing scope is more challenging.
We study how Large Language Models (LLMs) process negation mechanistically. First, we establish that even though open-weight models often provide wrong answers to questions involving negation, they do possess internal components that process negation correctly. Their poor accuracy is due to late-layer attention behavior that promotes simple shortcuts; ablating those attention modules greatly improves accuracy on negation-related questions. Second, we uncover how models process negation. We consider two hypotheses: models could use attention heads that attend to the phrase being negated and suppress related concepts, or they could directly construct a representation of the entire negative phrase (e.g., representing "not gas" as a vector that promotes liquids and solids). We apply a range of observational and causal interpretability techniques on Mistral-7B and Llama-3.1-8B to show that models implement both mechanisms, with the "constructive" mechanism being more prominent. Combined, our work deepens the understanding of LLMs' internals, highlighting construction-dominant computations and the coexistence of competing mechanisms within LLMs.
Negation is a common and important semantic feature in natural language, yet Large Language Models (LLMs) struggle when negation is involved in natural language understanding tasks. Commonsense knowledge, on the other hand, despite being a well-studied topic, lacks investigations involving negation. In this work, we show that commonsense knowledge with negation is challenging for models to understand. We present a novel approach to automatically augment existing commonsense knowledge corpora with negation, yielding two new corpora containing over 2M triples with if-then relations. In addition, pre-training LLMs on our corpora benefits negation understanding.
We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.