cs.SIJun 17, 2026

Digital Speech Acts Retain Control of Copyright with People, Not Platforms

Authors: James Golike, Ehud Shapiro

Organizations: London School of Economics and the Weizmann Institute of Science

Abstract

Legal precedents protect computer code as copyrightable expression. They have enabled centralized digital platforms -- operating from corporate servers that hold all user data -- to construct private governance regimes through the interaction of copyright, contract, and technical architecture: people who create virtually all platform value must surrender effective copyright control through Terms of Service agreements as a condition of participation. In contrast, grassroots platforms consist of cryptographically-identified people operating their networked smartphones independently of any server or global resource; each person holds their own data on their own device, with no third party in possession or intermediation. Here, we define the notion of a digital speech act -- a deliberate volitional act by a person of cryptographically signing personal content with the person's private key, carried out on the person's own device -- through which the person simultaneously establishes attribution, accountability, and authorship over the signed content. We contend that (i) digital speech acts qualify for copyright protection under existing U.S. precedent: Burrow-Giles locates authorship in volitional creative choices despite mechanical or algorithmic processes, Feist supplies the minimal-creativity threshold, and persistent device storage satisfies the Copyright Act's fixation requirement; (ii) the digital social contract underlying grassroots platforms preserves this copyright by design -- signed content cannot be unbundled from its signature, and the full provenance chain accumulates as content is forwarded -- so that copyright ownership and physical possession of authenticated digital expressions coalesce in the person; and (iii) this coalescence of legal ownership and physical possession provides the foundations for digital sovereignty and democratic self-governance.

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