Constituency Optimisation Through Hamiltonian Representation Of Mandates (COTHROM): Algorithmic Redistricting of Irish Election Boundaries

Spatial redistricting is a practical combinatorial optimization problem that demands high-quality solutions, rapid turnaround, and flexibility to accommodate multi-criteria objectives and interactive refinement. A central challenge is the contiguity constraint: enforcing contiguity in integer-programming or heuristic search can severely shrink the feasible neighborhood, weaken exploration, and trap the search in poor local optima. We introduce a composite-move Tabu search (CM-Tabu) that systematically expands the feasible neighborhood space in Tabu search while preserving contiguity. When a boundary unit cannot be reassigned individually without disconnecting its district, our method identifies a minimal set of units that can move together, or a pair of units (or sets of units) that can be switched, as a contiguity-preserving composite move. Candidate single-unit and composite moves are generated in linear time by analyzing each district's contiguity graph using articulation points and biconnected components. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed approach substantially improves solution quality, run-to-run robustness, and computational efficiency relative to traditional Tabu search and other baselines. For example, in the Philadelphia case, the approach can consistently attain the theoretical global optimum in population-equality and support multi-criteria trade-offs. CM-Tabu delivers optimization performance suitable for real-world practices and decision-support workflows.

Novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods have enabled the generation of large ensembles of redistricting plans modeled as a graph partitioning problem. However, existing algorithms such as Reversible Recombination (RevReCom) and Metropolized Forest Recombination (MFR) have strong preferences for distributions related to the spanning tree measure. In this paper we introduce the Marked Edge Walk (MEW), a novel Markov chain proposal for sampling from the space of graph partitions. The walk operates on the space of spanning trees with marked edges, allowing for calculable transition probabilities for use in the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Empirical results on real-world dual graphs show convergence under a broad class of target distributions less constrained by spanning tree counts, including policy-based distributions, such as competitiveness on New Hampshire that are independent of spanning trees, and compactness and partisan symmetry distributions on New Hampshire and Texas that, while related to spanning trees, can now be properly targeted with a smaller degree of spanning tree bias, which represents an advancement in flexible ensemble generation.

In an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates, a Condorcet winning set is a committee of $k$ candidates such that for any outside candidate, a majority of voters prefer some committee member. Condorcet's paradox shows that some elections admit no Condorcet winning sets with a single candidate (i.e., $k=1$), and the same can be shown for $k=2$. On the other hand, recent work proves that a set of size $k=5$ exists for every election. This leaves an important theoretical gap between the best known lower bound $(k\geq 3)$ and upper bound $(k \leq 5)$ for the number of candidates needed to guarantee existence. We aim to close the gap between the existence guarantees and impossibility results for Condorcet winning sets. We explore an automated reasoning approach to tighten these bounds. We design a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) to search for elections that would serve as counter-examples to conjectured bounds. We employ a number of optimizations, such as symmetry breaking, subsampling, and constraint generation, to enhance the search and model effectively infinite electorates. Furthermore, we analyze the dual of the linear programming relaxation as a path towards obtaining a new upper bound. Despite extensive search on moderate-sized elections, we fail to find any election requiring a committee larger than size 3. Motivated by our experimental results in this direction, we simplify the dual linear program and formulate a conjecture which, if true, implies that a winning set of size 4 always exists. Our automated reasoning results provide strong empirical evidence that the Condorcet dimension of any election may be smaller than currently known upper bounds, at least for small instances. We offer a general-purpose framework for searching elections in ranked voting and a new, concrete analytical path via duality toward proving that smaller committees suffice.