Answer Engineering: Local Trajectory Editing for Protocol-Constrained Decision Making in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) often achieve strong performance on reasoning benchmarks, but final-answer accuracy alone does not show whether they faithfully execute the procedure specified in a prompt. We introduce a controlled diagnostic benchmark for procedural execution, where models are given a step-wise arithmetic procedure and two numeric inputs, and must return the final computed value. Complexity is varied through procedure length and look-back dependencies over intermediate variables. Average first-answer accuracy drops from 63% on 5-step procedures to 20% on 95-step procedures. Generation-level analysis shows that failures often involve missing answers, premature answers, self-correction after an initial error and under-executed traces. These findings suggest that apparent reasoning ability can mask substantial weaknesses in faithful long-horizon procedural execution.

Procedural instruction following is a basic requirement for controllable language-model systems, especially when generated trajectories are inspected or repaired downstream. We introduce instruction duplication, a minimal black-box inference-time control that repeats only the procedural instruction, without retraining or decoding changes. Across seven instruction-tuned models, 300 medical multiple-choice questions, eight placement conditions, and 16,800 scheduled generations, moving from one to two copies raises the deterministic All-8 diagnostic--responses passing all eight observable tests--from 90.22% to 93.17% (+2.95 percentage points), eliminating 30.2% of the failures remaining after one copy. Pre-provisional TF-IDF recall rises from 73.44% to 74.81% (+1.38 points; Holm-adjusted p < .001), while final-answer accuracy remains exactly 60.21%. Premature commitment increases from 1.52% to 2.30% (p_Holm = .00536). A blinded challenge audit yields 10/30 directional confirmations, 20/30 perceptual ties, and no reversals; its prespecified 28/30 confirmation criterion is not met. Yet this distinction can matter operationally when a downstream system acts on the generated trajectory. In Answer Engineering (AE), where explicit trajectory state determines local repair, the published reason-first no-editing SSNHL endpoint was 25.1%; system-only AE was later reproduced at 84.2%, and the same trailing duplicate raised it to 97.1%. For conductive diagnostic branch preservation, the corresponding values are 58.9% published without editing, 78.6% with reproduced AE, and 73.8% with AE plus duplication--a within-AE decrease, but still 14.9 points above the no-editing baseline. Instruction duplication is therefore a low-complexity, placement-sensitive control whose practical value can emerge through the downstream system that consumes the exposed trajectory.

A standard recipe for distilling the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) is to sample chains of thought from the model, keep those that reach the correct final answer, and fine-tune on the survivors. When sampling fails, a common fix shows the generator the gold answer and asks it to write a chain that reaches that answer. We show that this second step degrades the training data in a way that correctness filtering cannot catch. We run a controlled experiment that fixes the generator, the problem set, and the correctness filter, and varies only whether the chain is generated under answer-conditioning, the gold answer shown with a request to reach it. Training a strong instruction-tuned reasoning model on its own answer-conditioned chains sharply lowers its verifiable-reasoning accuracy. The loss grows with difficulty, reaching as much as about 27 points on the hardest competition problems. The mechanism is legible in the chains themselves, which rationalize backward from the shown answer instead of deriving it, with the early final-answer statement as the measurable symptom. The harm is a property of the data rather than the generator, read off unlabeled generations before any fine-tuning, ordering the penalty across eight thinking models from four families, and transferring across teacher families. A prompt ablation localizes it to the rationalize-toward instruction rather than the answer's bare visibility. The practical takeaway is to generate answer-blind, because no correctness filter can see this damage in the data.