cs.CRJun 19, 2026

A Hybrid, Multi-Layered Pipeline for Phishing and Threat Classification: Independently Validated URL and NLP Engines with a Calibrated Multi-Channel Fusion Stage

Authors: Saifelden M. IsmailAser O. IbrahimOmar A. Mahmoud

Organizations: Department of Communications and Information Engineering Zewail City of Science and Technology, Giza, Egypt

Abstract

Phishing is a multi-modal threat. We present a hybrid pipeline that scores each modality with its own engine and fuses the results. Three engines are built, deployed, and independently benchmarked: a four-stage URL stack (Domain Guard, lexical model, threat intelligence, and an asymmetric L2 fusion sidecar); a generalization-hardened DistilBERT NLP classifier whose held-out real-phishing recall rises from 0.8% to 87.3%; and a threat-intelligence synchronizer with end-to-end OpenTelemetry instrumentation confirming 1:1 message conservation. A decision-level fusion stage, characterized on a 10,677-email whole-system benchmark, reaches F1=0.914 with a calibrated probabilistic-OR over URL, header, and phishing-probability channels while reducing held-out real-spam false positives to 3.6%. Because that benchmark uses proxy URL and header channels and an operating point still needing recalibration, we present it as a preliminary integrated result. For deployable detection, the limiting factor is how well a model generalizes, not how accurately it scores data drawn from its own training distribution.

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