RAVEN: Agentic RAG for Automated Vulnerability Repair

Modern software ecosystems face a rapidly growing number of disclosed vulnerabilities, increasing the need for automated repair techniques that can operate reliably at repository scale. Although Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents have recently shown promise for automated vulnerability repair (AVR), most existing systems still treat repair as a single generation step over the currently visible code context. As a result, they lack a persistent mechanism for reusing prior fixes or learning from failed validation attempts, which limits their effectiveness on complex, multi-file repair tasks. We present MemRepair, a memory-augmented agentic framework that formulates vulnerability repair as an iterative, experience-driven process. MemRepair combines three complementary memory layers, i.e., History-Fix, Security-Pattern, and Refinement-Trajectory memories, with a dynamic feedback-driven refinement loop. This design allows the agent to retrieve repository-specific repair conventions, apply reusable security defenses, and exploit prior "failure-to-success" trajectories to revise semantically invalid patches based on runtime evidence. We evaluate MemRepair on three representative repository-level vulnerability repair benchmarks: SEC-Bench, PatchEval (Python, Go, JavaScript), and the C++ subset of Multi-SWE-bench. MemRepair achieves state-of-the-art resolution rates of 58.0%, 58.2%, and 30.58%, respectively, outperforming strong general-purpose agents such as OpenHands and SWE-agent, as well as the specialized AVR tool InfCode-C++, while maintaining competitive repair cost. These results show that persistent, hierarchical repair memory can substantially improve the reliability of agentic vulnerability repair across diverse languages and repository settings.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various cybersecurity tasks, including vulnerability classification, detection, and patching. However, their potential in automated vulnerability report documentation and analysis remains underexplored. We present RAVEN (Retrieval Augmented Vulnerability Exploration Network), a framework leveraging LLM agents and Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) to synthesize comprehensive vulnerability analysis reports. Given vulnerable source code, RAVEN generates reports following the Google Project Zero Root Cause Analysis template. The framework uses four modules: an Explorer agent for vulnerability identification, a RAG engine retrieving relevant knowledge from curated databases including Google Project Zero reports and CWE entries, an Analyst agent for impact and exploitation assessment, and a Reporter agent for structured report generation. To ensure quality, RAVEN includes a task specific LLM Judge evaluating reports across structural integrity, ground truth alignment, code reasoning quality, and remediation quality. We evaluate RAVEN on 105 vulnerable code samples covering 15 CWE types from the NIST-SARD dataset. Results show an average quality score of 54.21%, supporting the effectiveness of our approach for automated vulnerability documentation.

Automated vulnerability repair aims to reduce the time and effort required to patch security flaws from a vulnerability triage report. Recent agentic AI approaches have shown promising results in automated program repair. However, vulnerability repair demands richer program context than general bug repair - context that security engineers routinely assemble in practice but that existing agentic approaches do not engineer. We identify three critical gaps: code-structure context capturing cross-file data flows and memory operation patterns, runtime-execution context revealing crash semantics and memory origins, and commit-history context recovering how fragile code patterns were introduced. We present AgenticRepair, an agentic vulnerability repair framework that addresses the gaps through multi-faceted program context engineering. AgenticRepair orchestrates three specialized LLM subagents to engineer the contexts, which are then embedded into the memory of a dedicated repair subagent for context-conditioned patch synthesis. Evaluated on SEC-Bench comprising 300 real-world instances with sanitizer-based patch verification, AgenticRepair achieves a 73% success rate, substantially outperforming the strongest baseline by 29%. Our ablation study confirms that the three context facets are mutually complementary, and that multi-agent scaffolding and base-model capacity each play an essential role. Collectively, these findings establish multi-faceted program context engineering as a promising design direction for agentic vulnerability repair.