Reinforcement Learning Towards Broadly and Persistently Beneficial Models
Authors: Akshay V. Jagadeesh, Rahul K. Arora, Khaled Saab, Ali Malik, Mikhail Trofimov, Foivos Tsimpourlas, Johannes Heidecke, Karan Singhal
Organizations: OpenAI
Abstract
As AI systems are deployed across increasingly diverse and high-stakes settings, model alignment must generalize beyond the tasks and domains seen during training. This is especially important for reinforcement learning (RL), which can introduce unexpected misalignment through reward hacking, deception, or other unintended strategies. We study whether RL on beneficial behavior, instantiated in realistic domains, can produce broad and persistent alignment generalization beyond the training distribution. We construct a dataset of realistic situations designed to measure and train beneficial traits, such as truthfulness, fairness, risk awareness, and corrigibility, spanning varied domains, including health, science, and education. We then train models with RL on this dataset and evaluate them on more than 50 independent benchmarks of alignment and beneficial behavior. Compared to a compute-matched baseline, beneficial trait RL improves performance on over 80% of these out-of-distribution benchmarks. We observe substantial out-of-distribution alignment transfer: a beneficial-behavior RL intervention entirely limited to one domain, health, produces broad improvements on non-health alignment evaluations, including reduced reward hacking, deception, and general misalignment. Finally, we study alignment persistence: whether behavior remains robustly aligned under attempts to steer models towards misalignment. Models trained with beneficial trait RL show improved persistence, including greater resistance to adversarial prompting and harmful finetuning; further work is required to isolate the sources of these effects. These results suggest that RL to reinforce beneficial behavior in realistic domains can produce models that are more robustly aligned with human flourishing.
Emergent misalignment (EM) is the surprising tendency of language models to become broadly misaligned after fine-tuning on narrowly misaligned examples. While EM has been extensively studied in the supervised fine-tuning (SFT) setting, evidence that it also arises from reinforcement learning (RL) is limited to large, closed-source models, leaving the phenomenon expensive to study and difficult to reproduce. We characterize EM from RL in small, off-the-shelf open-weight models along three axes. First, we show that rewarding narrow, overtly misaligned behavior produces substantially higher general-domain misalignment than sample-matched SFT. Second, we show that EM from RL can be induced by reward signals that could plausibly arise naturally, such as unpopular aesthetic preferences or poor rhetorical appeals. Third, we evaluate in-training mitigations developed for SFT-induced EM and find that they broadly transfer, with preventive steering with persona vectors, interleaving safety data and inoculation prompting all performing well.
Model post-training, and in particular reinforcement learning (RL), is one of the primary mechanisms by which developers can shape models' values and behaviors. However, as models become increasingly evaluation and training aware, they may be motivated to resist training when the perceived objective conflicts with their current values, undermining developers' ability to detect misalignment and correct model behavior through further training. In this paper, we demonstrate generalization hacking, in which a model collects reward during RL while preventing the rewarded behavior from generalizing. We construct a model organism on Qwen3-235B-A22B, finetuning on synthetic documents describing training awareness and self-inoculation, a novel mechanism in which the model frames compliance as context-specific in its chain of thought, without demonstrating or instructing either behavior. The model organism achieves train-time harmfulness comparable to controls while maintaining a persistent ∼15 percentage point compliance gap across 700 steps of RL. Additionally, a control organism trained only on training awareness documents independently discovers inoculation-like reasoning under RL pressure, developing its own compliance gap despite never being exposed to the concept. Because the generalization-hacking organism receives high reward throughout, standard training metrics provide no signal that generalization has failed. Our results constitute the first demonstration that a model can actively resist RL behavioral modification while maintaining high reward, suggesting that as models become more capable and training-aware, they may be able to undermine the training process itself.
Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is the standard method to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences. In this work, we introduce alignment tampering, a potential vulnerability where the LLM undergoing alignment influences the preference dataset, causing RLHF to amplify undesired behaviors. This arises from core limitations of RLHF: (1) preference datasets are constructed from the LLM's own outputs, allowing it to influence them, and (2) pairwise comparisons only indicate which response is better, not why. These limitations can be exploited to cause alignment tampering. For example, if an LLM generates biased responses with higher quality, annotators will prefer them based on quality. However, preference labels do not distinguish quality from bias, and the reward model inherits this limitation. Optimizing such rewards through reinforcement learning or best-of-N sampling can amplify misaligned biases. Our experiments demonstrate amplification across diverse biases: from keyword bias to propaganda (e.g., sexism), brand promotion, and instrumental goal-seeking. Mitigation remains challenging, as existing techniques for robust RLHF fail to fully resolve alignment tampering without sacrificing response quality. These findings reveal structural vulnerabilities of current RLHF and emphasize the need to prevent this vulnerability. Project page: https://alignment-tampering.github.io/