cs.MAJun 27, 2026

Metric Aggregation Divergence: A Hidden Validity Threat in Agent-Based Policy Optimization and a Contractual Remedy

Authors: Ruiyu ZhangLin NieXin Zhao

Organizations: Department of Politics and Public Administration · Department of Applied Social Sciences

Abstract

Metric aggregation divergence (MAD) is the silent inconsistency that arises when distinct pipeline stages in an agent-based model coupled with a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm (ABM+MOEA) independently re-implement how an outcome metric is extracted from simulation trajectories. Unlike deliberate analytical choices, MAD operates at the level of pipeline architecture: each stage is internally coherent, and the inconsistency becomes visible only when cross-stage outputs are compared. Code inspection of EpidemiOptim, a JAIR-published epidemic policy toolbox, reveals three structurally independent aggregation paths in peer-reviewed code. A faithful replication of this structure produces champion disagreement in 64.2% of independent runs (n=500, 95% CI: [59.9%, 68.3%]). In a 300-seed policy-flip experiment, divergent aggregation causes the optimizer to recommend the wrong champion in 83% of replications, with a mean welfare gap of 2.19 units and a Gini inequality gap of 0.050 units. In a follow-up inference audit, 3 of 249 flipped seeds cross the significance boundary itself. A complementary enterprise follow-up produces the predicted null under near-commensurable rankings (rho = 0.991), while a public upstream rerun of the Lake Problem DPS workflow shows that the archived published-path recommendation reaches joint-threshold success 0.401 whereas a shared contract-path rule reaches 0.552. We introduce the metric contract - a single shared callable enforced at dispatch time across all pipeline stages - as the remedy. Framed as standard engineering discipline applied to the cross-stage metric interface, the contract eliminates divergence by construction with approximately 3% runtime overhead.

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