Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as content moderation tools, yet they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks in which harmful text is visually encoded as ASCII art. This can allow inappropriate or harmful content to bypass moderation systems. To address this vulnerability, this paper investigates how image resolution affects VLM detection of harmful ASCII art across eight character construction modes (L1-L8), ranging from dense block characters to word-embedded designs. We evaluate eight state-of-the-art VLMs on English and Chinese corpora using a pipeline that generates ASCII art images at ten resolution scales, probing whether a consistent detection-failure threshold exists across models, modes, and languages. Results indicate that detection rates decline sharply above certain resolution thresholds, and that word-based modes are the most resistant to detection across the full resolution range. These findings reveal a systematic vulnerability in VLM-based content moderation systems and motivate resolution-aware evaluation standards.
Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used to detect whether AI-generated images contain visible artifacts, yet their ability to analyze such artifacts remains poorly understood. A correct image-level decision can still hide important failures: a model may correctly flag an artifact while relying on the wrong visual cue, selecting the wrong region, or describing a defect that the image does not support. To evaluate these behaviors directly, we introduce SalArt-VQA, a diagnostic benchmark for fine-grained SALient ARTifact understanding in AI-generated images. SalArt-VQA contains 950 images and 3,681 human-authored multiple-choice questions spanning artifact images, matched real reference images, and paired generated reference images. Four aligned question types evaluate presence detection, semantic localization, spatial grounding, and evidence-grounded defect identification, while the reference splits test calibration and abstention when the annotated defect is absent. Across 20 VLMs, SalArt-VQA reveals failures that image-level detection accuracy hides: the strongest model reaches 99.37% detection recall on artifact images but answers all four artifact-side questions correctly on only 53.26% of images. Comparing artifact images with artifact-free references reveals a sensitivity-calibration tradeoff: sensitive models often make unsupported artifact claims, while conservative models avoid false alarms largely by missing real artifacts. These results show that high artifact detection accuracy alone does not imply grounded artifact understanding. SalArt-VQA exposes these hidden failure modes and provides a fine-grained evaluation of whether VLM artifact claims are supported by local visual evidence.
Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated strong performance across multimodal tasks, yet their safety robustness remains an open challenge. While prior work has shown that structured visual prompts such as flowcharts can effectively jailbreak VLMs, existing studies are largely limited to English-centric settings. In this paper, we introduce MLingualFC, a multilingual multimodal benchmark designed to evaluate jailbreak vulnerabilities of VLMs across diverse languages using structured flowchart representations. MLingualFC encodes harmful instructions into flowchart images across five languages (Hindi, Punjabi, Spanish, Romanian, and German). We evaluate state-of-the-art multilingual VLMs, including Qwen2.5-VL, Gemma-4, and Pangea, under a black-box threat model. Our results reveal significant multilingual safety gaps. Flowchart-based attacks achieve high attack success rates (ASR) in case of Latin script languages, demonstrating that visual encoding of harmful content effectively bypasses safety alignment across languages. In contrast, non-Latin script languages such as Punjabi exhibit substantially lower ASR, suggesting potential limitations in visual text recognition rather than stronger safety alignment. These findings highlight that current VLM safety mechanisms fail to generalize across languages and modalities. Resources are available at https://github.com/Rishabhpm23/MLingualFC
Large language model (LLM)-powered content moderation systems are a critical defense against harmful online content. However, they operate primarily on tokenized text and often overlook visual cues that humans naturally use when interpreting content. We show that this limitation creates a fundamental vulnerability: content readily recognized as harmful by humans can evade automated moderation. To systematically study this problem, we introduce Human-Perceptible Adversarial Attacks (HPAA), which embed harmful expressions into otherwise benign text using visually salient typographic manipulations. HPAA strategically combines features such as spacing, emphasis, and spatial arrangement to preserve human recognition while reducing machine detectability. Operating in a black-box setting with a small query budget, the attack automatically generates evasive content without model access or gradient information. We evaluate HPAA on multiple datasets and thirteen widely deployed moderation systems, including commercial APIs and state-of-the-art open-source guardrails. With only three detector queries, generated attacks achieve over 86% human recognition while keeping detection rates below 1% across evaluated systems. We further identify the typographic factors driving successful evasion, analyze why current moderation architectures fail to capture these signals, and discuss practical defenses. Our findings reveal a fundamental blind spot in current LLM-based moderation systems and motivate moderation approaches that better align with human perceptual understanding.