The visual quality of AI-generated videos has improved drastically in recent years, making it increasingly difficult for humans to distinguish between real and synthetic media. In this work, we evaluate the robustness and applicability of four state-of-the-art motion-based AI-generated video detectors. We identify significant preprocessing and sampling biases in these methods and demonstrate that they account for a substantial portion of their reported performance. Furthermore, we find that these detectors are highly sensitive to motion patterns specific to their evaluation datasets, where AI-generated videos generally exhibit less inter-frame movement than real videos. We show that for all detectors, performance collapses to near-random levels when evaluated on a dataset that does not contain this motion bias. Additionally, through dataset rebalancing and the application of simple spatial augmentations, we observe severe performance degradation across all evaluated models. In contrast, we find that an existing frequency-based detector maintains strong performance across all evaluated datasets, suggesting that frequency-based approaches may offer a more generalizable path forward for AI-generated video detection. We hope that our work raises awareness towards these vulnerabilities and encourages the development of more representative, unbiased datasets and more robust evaluation protocols.
AI-generated video detection benchmarks such as GenVidBench and AIGVDBench are the de facto leaderboards, yet most evaluation protocols leave uncontrolled confounds that can inflate reported generalization. As an existence proof, a three-feature clip-length classifier reaches a leave-one-generator-out (LOGO) AUC of 0.998 on GenVidBench under unaudited evaluation, while measuring nothing about motion. A 20-paper survey finds none applying all six standard controls that would catch this, so we combine them into an audited protocol and apply it to six representative feature sources (three published detectors and three repurposed signal sources), re-running it cross-dataset on AIGVDBench. The audit both debunks and certifies: the trivial classifier collapses to near chance (0.529), a CLIP baseline is caught carrying dataset identity, and the 2025 forensic detector WaveRep clears the floor at out-of-distribution LOGO AUC 0.996 with chance-level real-vs-real coherence. At a deployable FPR of 0.1%, multiple high-AUC methods fall to single-digit recall and the leaderboard order changes, so we recommend an audited tuple (AUC, above-floor margin, operating-point recall, and calibration) over a single number. As a white-box positive control, we add TemporalSpec (codec motion vectors); via cross-substrate feature fusion (XSFF), a second substrate adds genuine complementarity that survives the audit. We release VidAudit, to our knowledge the largest unified and audited detector collection for this task, providing 14 detectors behind one plugin API, a leaderboard, and Croissant metadata, available at https://github.com/KurbanIntelligenceLab/vidaudit. Together, the protocol and toolkit move evaluation from leaderboard rank toward whether a result measures what it claims.
Detectors for AI-generated video are evaluated offline. A clip is decoded to pixels and scored once, increasingly by a large vision-language model. Detection, however, is deployed online. We recast the task as streaming perception and score the motion field the codec already wrote into the bitstream. Reading that field is a parse, not a pixel-domain forward pass. Because the running aggregate is monotone, one end-calibrated threshold is anytime-valid at the data-dependent decision time. Recalibrating at each prefix is not. Escalation is priced in closed form. A compute budget maps to a deferral window, on a frontier monotone exactly where the deferral condition holds. On matched GenVidBench the codec stage reaches full-length AUC 0.64 at five orders of magnitude less compute than a pixel CNN, on CPU. Its gate holds the stopping-time false-positive rate at target while the real data match its calibration, and drifts above it under distribution shift. Deferring 15% of clips lifts accuracy from 0.75 to 0.78 at 7× less compute (paired: McNemar p<10−6). The stage-1 ordering replicates on AIGVDBench. We introduce no new detector. The contribution is the reframing, two guarantees, and the measured frontiers. Code, configurations, and evaluation splits: https://github.com/KurbanIntelligenceLab/streamdet.
Mert Onur Cakiroglu, Mehmet Dalkilic, Hasan Kurban
With the rapid advancement of video generation models, distinguishing between AI-generated and authentic videos has emerged as a challenging endeavor. The majority of existing research endeavors concentrate on the development of detectors for identifying samples generated by generative adversarial networks. Nevertheless, the detection of AI-generated videos, particularly those produced by text-to-video models, still remains an uncharted territory. Although state-of-the-art text-to-video models can generate realistic visual content similar to real videos, they fall short of generating the details of the images and the changes in details within the videos. Inspired by this, we address AI-generated video detection from a novel perspective of bit-planes, which can effectively describe the details or noises in images or videos. To this end, we propose a simple yet effective approach called Noise Amplification. This approach first extracts noise signals based on bit-planes, then amplifies these noise signals, and finally feeds them into the discriminator networks for video fake classification. Noise amplification is comprehensively constructed by incorporating three aspects: pixel-level intensity enhancement, region-level spatial amplification, and frame-level temporal aggregation. To evaluate methods of AI-generated video detection in challenging scenarios, we also introduce a benchmark named HardGVD. Extensive experiments on both the large-scale dataset GenVidBench and HardGVD show that our simple approach significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods.