Verification of Dynamic Holographic Behavior in Identity Documents
Authors: Glen Pouliquen, Joseph Chazalon, Guillaume Chiron, Thierry Géraud, Ahmad Montaser Awal
Organizations: IDnow Research Center, France · EPITA Research Lab · IDnow Research Center, Cesson-Sévigné, France · EPITA Research Lab. (LRE), Le Kremlin-Bicêtre, France
Abstract
This paper addresses the remote verification of the authenticity of Optically Variable Devices (commonly known as holograms) on identity documents. Typically placed over the cardholder's photo, these devices provide strong and easily verifiable security for human inspection but pose challenges for automated verification. Existing approaches easily cover static frauds (e.g. paper photocopy) and can be evaluated for such, but their capacity to detect real, dynamic fraud cases (e.g. handcrafted hologram) has not been evaluated to date because of the lack of public datasets. Furthermore, they are usually trained to detect known attack types, and few of them can generalize to new, unseen attacks. This work features three contributions to address these limitations: 1) a new public dataset, MIDV-DynAttack, which extends the existing MIDV-Holo dataset with realistic, static and dynamic attacks against identity document specimens, tripling the number of attack samples compared to the original dataset, 2) a novel verification method which can assess the authenticity of a specific hologram thanks to the analysis of its dynamic behavior and appearance, can be trained without dynamic attack samples, and exhibits new state-of-the-art performance, 3) a benchmark of existing approaches which follows a clear evaluation protocol and emphasizes the inability of other approaches to deal with dynamic attacks, as well as new challenging attacks to deal with. Code and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/EPITAResearchLab/pouliquen.25.icdar.
Robust remote verification of identity documents relies on analyzing faint, transparent security features like Optically Variable Devices (OVDs), or "holograms", within user-captured videos under uncontrolled conditions. Current systems, however, face critical limitations: existing methods often treat video frames in isolation, neglecting the intrinsic dynamic nature of OVDs and leaving systems vulnerable to swapping attacks, or focus on general holographic presence and lack the ability to verify specific OVD types. Moreover, the economic infeasibility of frame-by-frame video annotation makes supervised training impractical. In this work, we introduce two novel approaches for verifying the dynamic behavior of transparent OVDs protecting the holder's portrait, specifically designed for open-set scenarios where attack types are unknown during training. We demonstrate that these approaches can be trained without any attack samples in a self-supervised setting, surpassing previous state-of-the-art methods on public datasets while adhering strictly to industrial constraints. Our results confirm that modeling temporal dynamics is essential for defeating sophisticated attacks under realistic conditions, and underscores the promise of sequence modeling and anomaly detection for OVD verification. Code is available at https://github.com/EPITAResearchLab/pouliquen.26.icdar.
Glen Pouliquen, Joseph Chazalon, Guillaume Chiron +3
Remote identity authentification using Identification Documents has been a major challenge for several years. DeepFakes advent and the development of AI-guided tools helps fraudsters creating counterfeit ID Documents. Ensuring the authenticity of ID Documents has become a real clue in the seurization of remote authentification. This need is all the more pressing given the increasing digitization of administrative and transactional processes. To ensure widespread accessibility, the system should rely solely on video captured via mobile devices. In this specific context, confirming the authenticity of ID is a real challenge as many security features needs specific device like infrared sensor for instance. Among underutilized but promising security features, holographic printings hold a special place. Difficult to counterfeit, they produce distinctive visual effects according enlightment, making them both detectable in a video captured by a smartphone camera and difficult to imitate. In this paper, we propose a Remote Identity Document Verification System (RIDVS) and an approach based on a video transformer for detecting holograms in simple videos captured by smartphones. Our system is designed for a smartphone-based capture process, followed by a server-side verification. The hologram detection method builds on a robust model previously validated in a related research domain. We demonstrate that it outperforms existing SotA methods, achieving near-perfect accuracy even when trained on medium- to small-sized datasets. In particular, we report improvements of +26.86% in Recall and +17.93% in accuracy over the best MIDV-Holo baseline. This study includes several experiments that evaluate the model adaptation to frugality, both for training samples and computational resources.
Joris Voerman, Nicolas Sidere, Jean-Christophe Burie
Digital identity verification systems used in remote onboarding rely on document images to authenticate users, making them vulnerable to localized manipulations of key identity fields such as facial photographs and textual information. Existing forgery detection methods, developed primarily for natural-image forensics, show limited transferability to structured identity documents. We propose FLiD, a lightweight field-localized framework that targets critical identity regions rather than processing full-document images. A fine-tuned object detector first localizes face and text fields; a frozen MobileNetV3-Small backbone then extracts compact field-level embeddings, which are classified by lightweight neural network with only 191K trainable parameters. FLiD achieves AUC scores of 0.880 (face), 0.954 (text), and 0.923 (both-field attacks), with corresponding EERs of 18.05%, 11.61%, and 15.16%, representing absolute reductions of 29-35 percentage points over a full-document baseline trained from scratch. FLiD also consistently outperforms general-purpose manipulation detectors (TruFor, MMFusion, UniVAD) across all attack scenarios while requiring 13x fewer parameters and 21x fewer FLOPs