Authors: Ethan Roland, Murat Cubuktepe, Erick Martinez, Stijn Servaes, Keenan Pepper, Mike Vaiana, Diogo Schwerz de Lucena, Judd Rosenblatt, +3 more
Abstract
AI developers face a dual-use dilemma. An AI capability that helps one user cure a disease can help another synthesize one. This dilemma could be resolved with access control, limiting dual-use AI capabilities to trusted deployments with a legitimate need. A gold standard for access control would be to serve separate models with different capabilities to different users. However, training and deploying multiple models is prohibitively expensive. To address this challenge, we propose gradient-routed auxiliary modules (GRAM), a pre-training method that adds modules to a neural network and selectively updates them to induce specialization. Ablating a module at inference time removes its capability from the network, approximating a model trained on filtered data. We evaluate GRAM on synthetic stories and realistic dual-use data spanning virology, cybersecurity, nuclear physics, and specialized code. These experiments show that GRAM disables targeted capabilities while preserving the rest, and resists their recovery under finetuning better than post-hoc unlearning. Most importantly, a Chinchilla-optimal scaling analysis from 50M to 5B parameters shows that the gap between data-filtered and full-data models widens with scale on removed capabilities but stays small on retained ones, and that GRAM closely tracks data filtering. GRAM's training cost is independent of the number of supported capability profiles, yielding a 5x reduction over data filtering in our 5-profile setting.
Deployed language model safeguards (safety fine-tuning, filtering, unlearning) vary by principal only outside the model weights: filters are reconfigured, tiers are multiplied, and artefacts are reissued; inside one set of weights every request meets the same model configuration. This motivates us to define capability-gated deployment: per-principal access control inside one set of weights, whose configurations form a lattice - meets accumulate a principal's restrictions and joins pool a coalition's reach. We instantiate it by sparse rank gating over an existing nested-factorisation mechanism, guide profile search with one-pass attribution, and read every result once from a pre-registered held-out split. Security composes: provably at meets under a monotone-elicitation assumption we falsify pointwise. In two lineages the median held-out meet deepens suppression; the one effect surviving correction strengthens it. Utility does not: individually harmless profiles can compose to retention and fluency damage, and no compositional bound exists.
Patrikas Vanagas, Augustas Mačijauskas, Laurynas Lopata
Most language-model access controls regulate behavior while leaving the same computation available to every request. We study a different systems question: can trusted authorization determine which newly trained parameters are reachable by the forward pass? Policy-Masked Private Experts freezes a pretrained sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model, trains a disjoint expert branch, and selects the public or private pool before top-k routing. The resulting claim is narrow but testable: under the declared trusted computing base (TCB), an unauthorized request executes no private expert. It does not imply that the public model lacks the same semantic capability. We test this separation between execution control and task utility in Qwen3-30B-A3B and DeepSeek-V2-Lite. Three Qwen BF16 seeds update all 32 private experts while the public fingerprint remains unchanged. Across 64 adversarial scenarios and 96 deny/fail-closed events, unauthorized private execution is zero; independent hooks exactly match 11,616 routed private rows and allow-deny-allow recovery is exact. On two prospectively frozen Qwen benchmarks, the private branch improves exact tool use by 5.0 percentage points (pp) (five versus zero discordances; one-sided Holm p = 0.03125, corresponding two-sided exact p = 0.0625) and 21.3 pp (percentile-bootstrap 95% CI [13.3, 29.3], Holm p = 0.000031). Three arm-blinded model evaluators retain a positive external effect of 18.7 pp (95% CI [9.3, 28.0]). A parameter-matched Lora has similar external utility, but a post-hoc request gate leaves 1,225 adapter calls under deny; the disjoint expert branch leaves none. DeepSeek reproduces the route invariant and gains 27.0 pp. A valid sealed evaluation is near-neutral. These results support auditable, reversible control over a trained parameter path, while showing that useful transfer remains distribution dependent.
Released aligned large language models remain vulnerable to malicious downstream finetuning. Existing defenses are largely designed for the fine-tuning-as-a-service (FTaaS) paradigm or rely on downstream users to follow additional safety procedures, and therefore do not directly address the setting we study: a provider controlled partially protected open-weight (PPOW) release setting in which most weights remain trainable while a small safety-critical component is preserved at release. We propose a Unidirectional Safety Gate (USG), instantiated as a Null Space Cubic Layer together with an Inverse Adapter inserted after the final Transformer layer. During downstream fine-tuning, the cubic layer suppresses or blocks gradients from harmful samples whose hidden states fall in a calibrated protected region, while the Inverse Adapter restores the base model's forward behavior. In practice, we calibrate a threshold using defender-held harmful data, allowing protection to generalize to nearby in-distribution harmful samples. Across six evaluated model-dataset settings, USG keeps post-finetuning attack success rate close to the pre-release level under a fixed release threshold, while maintaining high safe-pass rates on easier settings and exhibiting a clearer safety-utility trade-off on unsafe samples from BeaverTails. These results suggest that release-time representation-space blocking can raise the cost of malicious downstream adaptation without requiring downstream cooperation. The code is available at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/Gradient-Immunity.