Cyber-physical systems built on deterministic edge inference, such as on-vehicle flood detection for agricultural fields, produce structured decision logs that must be interpreted differently by heterogeneous stakeholders. Pairing such systems with large language models (LLMs) to generate stakeholder-specific reports introduces a tension: the generative layer is non-deterministic, while the edge plane must remain replayable and auditable. We propose an architectural pattern resting on two invariants: unidirectional consumption, in which the generative layer is a strict read-only consumer of the deterministic plane and never writes back, and persona-as-configuration, in which stakeholder adaptation is a versioned prompt-template artifact rather than runtime improvisation. We instantiate the pattern as a context-aware dashboard layer over the JSON decision logs of a previously published edge-based standing-water detection system, and analyse how the integration boundary admits standard generative-reliability mitigations as configuration- or middleware-level extension points. A structured expert review rated the pattern favourably across five ISO/IEC 25010-aligned quality dimensions, with strongest agreement on separation of concerns. End-user evaluation with agricultural stakeholders is planned for future work.
The incorporation of generative models into traditional computational systems presents both enormous opportunity and tremendous peril. Although many early adopters have realized these perils at great expense, the field still requires foundational frameworks to de-risk incorporation of AI into traditional systems. This manuscript establishes this foundation through the definition of four specific primitives of AI blended architecture, designed to enable deterministic encapsulation of probabilistic models. It further establishes two overarching anti-patterns broadly represented across industry to serve as warnings for engineers in this field. This framework was designed to enable successful integration of AI into traditional systems while providing a foundation upon which generative model providers could build the next generation of generative model interfaces.
Production language-model systems answer a request by partitioning it across an invisible orchestration of worker agents that recompose one integrated report. We ask what this does to a class of defect no single worker can see: a contradiction in the relation between two distant sections of a document. Holding the documents, defects, mechanism, scoring, and seed fixed, we vary only the model -- ten systems across five generations from one developer and five providers from distinct alignment paradigms. Two layers separate. First, a universal detection cliff: every model that finds these cross-section defects under a single agent loses that ability under orchestration, detection falling two-thirds or more across every paradigm tested. The cliff is mechanism-derived and not closed by scale or extended reasoning. Second, how models behave once fallen. A signal-detection decomposition shows that, among the six models discriminating above chance, only one developer's generations move along the reporting-criterion axis: as alignment is strengthened, the model misses fewer defects yet raises more false alarms on clean documents -- two faces of one criterion shift, scaling with generation within that developer (p < 0.001) and near-absent elsewhere. At the floor the missed defect is often not out of view: the model's private record reconstructs the structural fault accurately, while the integrated report signs off on its soundness, its concern spent on the artifact and an absent collaborator. This resists quantification -- an automated judge is unstable (precision 17-50%) and keywords cannot separate it from ordinary agreement -- a resistance we report as a finding. We release all runs, probes, defect keys, scorer prompts, and scripts. An integrated report's confidence is uninformative about partition-spanning defects, the most aligned systems are not the safest, and the cliff is structural.
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are difficult to detect and interpret due to their multi-stage and stealthy nature. While recent autonomous defense systems leverage provenance graphs and learning-based models for detection and mitigation, their outputs remain largely machine-oriented and difficult for analysts to interpret. Large language models (LLMs) offer a promising interface for report generation, but often produce hallucinated or weakly grounded content. In this paper, we propose DeepFaith, an evidence-grounded framework for faithful incident reporting in multi-stage APT defense. DeepFaith transforms structured outputs from autonomous defense and explainability modules into natural-language reports that are explicitly aligned with underlying system evidence. The framework integrates a unified evidence representation, evidence-grounded prompting, faithfulness-aware generation, and post-generation verification to ensure that all generated statements are supported. Experiments in a realistic enterprise testbed demonstrate that DeepFaith improves faithfulness from 0.68 to 0.92, reduces unsupported claims from 0.32 to 0.08, and increases temporal consistency from 0.6 to 0.88, while maintaining concise reports and lower error rates than existing template-based and LLM-based solutions. These results show that evidence-grounded generation enables reliable, interpretable, and actionable reporting for security operations centers.