The Weight of Silence: A Causal Case for Weights Over the Scratchpad in Latent Chess Reasoning

Chain-of-thought reasoning unfolds in discrete token space: each step is committed as text, errors propagate, and eliciting good traces presupposes traces to imitate. Reasoning instead in a model's continuous representation space - where intermediate states are vectors rather than words - sidesteps these constraints, but leaves open how those latent states should be computed. We approach this along two axes. First, we keep a large language model (LLM) frozen and use it for what it is already good at - modeling and decoding sequences - while a small auxiliary network supplies continuous latent thoughts as input. Second, we produce those latents by recurrence: a tiny recurrent reasoner refines them over many steps, decoupling the depth of computation from the size of the model, so that the latents are a product of iterative processing rather than a single forward pass. We instantiate this as Latent Recurrent Thoughts (LRT): a task-dedicated proposer supplies base latents, a recurrent reasoner refines them through bounded residual corrections, and the frozen LLM decodes the answer. On symbolic reasoning with answer supervision but no reasoning traces (Countdown-4, Sudoku) and on natural-language reasoning (HumanEval, MBPP, StrategyQA), LRT substantially outperforms prior frozen-decoder continuous-space reasoning methods under an identical decoder, prompt, data, and training budget, and outperforms non-thinking-mode chain-of-thought prompting on the same backbone at a small fraction of its inference compute.

Latent reasoning models (LRMs) replace explicit chain-of-thought with continuous thoughts. Recent work treats observable latent-state patterns, such as BFS-like frontiers and decodable arithmetic computation, as evidence for internal reasoning mechanisms. Evaluating two LRMs (Coconut and CODI) against controls lacking the proposed recurrence or curriculum, we find these patterns also appear in the controls and do not always causally affect behavior. Causal interventions reveal that latent-thought utilization is not binary but graded, scaling with a thought's causal effect on model behavior. Geometric analyses reveal this effect concentrates in low-rank directions whose step-to-step geometry grows more structured as their behavioral influence increases. Latent thoughts should therefore be treated as hidden computation, not hidden explanation: decodability, attention, or static structure alone cannot establish mechanism. LRM interpretability thus requires matched controls and causal tests.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become central to improving large language models (LLMs) on complex reasoning tasks, yet RL post-training is largely studied in isolation from the pretraining that precedes it. As a result, two basic questions remain open: (1) how do pretraining choices (model size, data) shape the returns to RL compute, and (2) what does RL actually do to the model? These questions are difficult to study in the standard LLM setting: pretraining corpora are vast and uncontrolled, making it hard to attribute behaviors to pretraining versus RL, and systematic compute sweeps across both stages are prohibitively expensive. To address these challenges, we use chess as a controlled testbed for studying reasoning across the full pretraining-to-post-training pipeline. We follow the standard LLM training pipeline by pretraining language models from 5M to 1B parameters on human chess games, supervised fine-tuning on synthetic reasoning traces, and running RL on chess puzzles with verifiable rewards. Using this framework, we find that the post-RL performance at given RL compute level is well-predicted from the pretraining loss, and slope of the RL reward curves improves approximately linearly with the pretraining tokens. Beyond scaling, we find that RL does not simply sharpen the SFT policy: on easy puzzles it amplifies correct moves the SFT policy already preferred, while on hard puzzles it surfaces correct moves that were nearly absent under SFT. We further test whether our findings transfer beyond chess by training a 1B language model on math-domain text, where the same predictive pattern emerges: longer-pretrained checkpoints reach higher post-RL performance and improve faster under RL. In sum, we provide a quantitative account of the pretraining-to-RL interface and a controlled testbed for studying the science of reasoning across the full pretraining-to-post-training pipeline.