Interview with Kalle Lyytinen on "Implications of Theories of Language for Information Systems"

Large language models are increasingly used in scholarly work, yet it remains unclear whether their productivity gains are accompanied by changes in research novelty. We examine how relative abstract-level semantic novelty in Information Systems journals changed after ChatGPT became widely available and whether this change differed across institutional language contexts. We analyze 13,847 articles published from 2020 to 2025 in 44 A* and A Information Systems journals. Using SPECTER2 representations of titles and abstracts, we measure each article's semantic distance from its nearest recent predecessors and estimate a comparative pre/post model. Articles whose first authors were affiliated with institutions in non-English-dominant countries show a 0.176 standard deviation larger post-2022 decline in relative semantic novelty than articles from English-dominant affiliations, equivalent to about 7 percentile points. The pattern is similar across several alternative specifications, although the balanced-author estimate is less precise. We interpret this finding through a tension in generative AI-supported knowledge work. GenAI can widen access to prior knowledge and support new combinations, but it can also make established frames easier to reproduce. Because individual LLM use is not observed, the result identifies a heterogeneous post-2022 shift rather than an effect of LLM adoption. The study extends research on LLMs and scholarly productivity by shifting attention from publication counts to the semantic positioning of published articles and by showing that post-2022 change differs across institutional contexts.

Futrell and Mahowald (2025) frame the success of neural language models (LMs) as supporting gradient, usage-based linguistic theories. I argue that LMs can also instantiate theories based on formal structures - the types of theories seen in the generative tradition. This argument expands the space of theories that can be tested with LMs, potentially enabling reconciliations between usage-based and generative accounts.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has intensified debates about their significance for linguistic theory. These debates are commonly divided into three positions: insulationism, which regards LLMs as irrelevant to human language; eliminativism, which claims that LLMs can replace traditional linguistic theories; and conciliationism, which views them as useful tools for linguistic research. To clarify these positions, this paper applies the framework of modal modeling from the philosophy of science. We argue that LLMs possess genuine epistemic value as minimal models, even without structural correspondence to human cognition. In particular, they can provide how-possibly explanations (HPEs) by testing modal claims about language acquisition and linguistic competence. We then examine the conditions under which LLMs could qualify as how-actually explanations (HAEs) of human language, drawing on the mechanistic account of scientific explanation. We argue that current LLMs do not yet satisfy these requirements. On the basis of this analysis, we propose understanding the explanatory power of LLMs as lying on a continuum between HPEs and HAEs. This framework avoids both overstating and understating their explanatory significance and offers a more precise basis for evaluating the role of LLMs in the scientific study of language.